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The Promissory Basis of Section 90
Edward Yoriot and Steve Theltt
INTRODUCTION
As conceived and drafted, Section 90 of the Second Restatement of Con-
tracts is based primarily on principles of reliance.' It rests on the proposition
that a person who has led another to rely on a promise ought to compensate
the other for any harm suffered in reliance.2 This Article shows that the promi-
nence of reliance in the text of Section 90 and in the commentary on the
section does not correspond to what courts do in fact. Judges actually enforce
promises rather than protect reliance in Section 90 cases.3
Section 90 has been described as the Restatement's "most notable and
influential rule"4 and as "perhaps the most radical and expansive development
of this century in the law of promissory liability."5 The section has had a
profound influence on the law of contracts because it ratifies cases enforcing
a promise in the absence of bargained-for consideration.6 By giving its impri-
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1. In the Second Restatement, § 90 reads as follows:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted
for breach may be limited as justice requires.
(2) A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding under Subsection (1) with-
out proof that the promise induced action or forbearance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
In the original Restatement, § 90 read as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 62-64 and 170-74.
3. The title of the Article thus refers to § 90 in the courts.
4. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.19, at 95 (2d ed. 1990).
5. Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel,
81 COLMI. L. REV. 52, 53 (1981).
6. The consideration doctrine is incorporated in § 71 of the Second Restatement, which reads in part
as follows:
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.
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matur to those cases, the Restatement has encouraged courts to expand contrac-
tual liability beyond the traditional doctrinal limits of consideration.7
Most commentators, like the Second Restatement itself, hold that the
objective of Section 90 is to protect promisees from loss caused by reliance on
a promise.8 Some commentators even argue that Section 90 has contributed
to the replacement of promise with reliance as the basis of contractual liabili-
ty.9 As this Article shows, however, these commentators are wrong about the
way courts have decided Section 90 cases. Rather than using Section 90 to
compensate promisees for losses suffered in reliance, judges use it to hold
people to their promises by granting specific performance or by awarding
expectation damages.
Part I places the conflict between promise and reliance theories of
Section 90 in historical perspective, showing that Section 90 of the original Re-
statement was conceived and drafted primarily in terms of promise and that the
changes adopted by the Second Restatement reflect an endorsement of reliance
as the principle governing both liability and remedy under the section. Part II
shows that the remedy courts routinely grant under Section 90 is specific
performance or (if feasible) expectation damages.10 Cases granting less than
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange
for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981).
7. See Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678,678 (1984)
("[C]ourts and scholars have come to recognize promissory estoppel as a principle of wide application.");
Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 343
(1969) ("Recent decisions invoking Section 90 ... demonstrate that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
embodied in that section is playing an important role in the fixing of limits of contractual responsibility."
(footnote omitted)).
8. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6-1, at 273 (3d
ed. 1987) ("[Ilnjury is what is required because without injury there would be no injustice in not enforcing
the promise."); FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 102 ("One person has caused harm to another...
and is therefore held liable for the harm caused."); Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements
and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 487 (1950) (no impelling reason to give promisee
more than detriment suffered in reliance); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 32 (1979) ("Relied upon donative promises should be enforced to the extent of the reliance."); L.L. Fuller
& William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1-2), 46 YALE LJ. 52, 373, 69
(1936-1937) ("If reliance is here the sine qua non of legal intervention, then protection of the reliance
interest is obviously a part of the motive actuating courts in such cases."); Michael B. Metzger & Michael
J. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS
L. REV. 472, 499 (1983) (promissory estoppel doctrine may be used to protect promisee's reliance interest);
Warren A. Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L REV. 913, 926
(1951) ("The wrong is not primarily in depriving the plaintiff of the promised reward but in causing the
plaintiff to change position to his detriment."); Warren L. Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?,
35 MICH. L. REV. 908,944 (1937) ("[T]he reason for allowing the gratuitous promisee an action is his injury
through reliance and not the promisor's act of promising.").
9. See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 777 (1979) (expansion of § 90
"indicates a resurgence of reliance-based liability at the expense of consensual liability"); GRANT GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 72 (1974) (reliance principle of § 90 has effectively swallowed up bargain
principle); cf. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 102 (justification for liability under § 90 may be
founded on tort principle of compensation for harm).
10. If the promisor promises to refrain from acting in a particular way, expectancy relief may take the
form of a negative injunction ordering the promisor not to act in violation of her promise. See infra text
accompanying notes 224-27.
Section 90
expectancy relief are relatively rare, and the only substantive explanation for
that outcome is a defect in the promise or in the proof of the promise. By fully
enforcing promises with expectancy relief rather than limiting the remedy to
reliance," courts belie the claim that the objective of Section 90 is to compen-
sate promisees for losses suffered in reliance. Part III shows that courts may
enforce a promise under Section 90 in the absence of reliance or detriment.
Conversely, courts may not enforce a promise under the section despite detri-
mental reliance by the promisee. Both results are inconsistent with a reliance-
based theory. Part IV shows that the critical question for courts under Sec-
tion 90 is which promises to enforce, not what remedy to award or how to
protect reliance. A promise will be fully enforced under the section if the
promise is proven convincingly and is likely to have been serious and well
considered when it was made. Issues of both liability and remedy turn on
promise, showing that the basis of Section 90 in the courts is promise, not
reliance. 12
Our findings indicate that Section 90, like the doctrine of consideration,
works to enforce promises that are likely to be serious. The role of the consid-
eration doctrine in screening for serious promises is well understood.13 Al-
though it is not so widely recognized, the prospect of definite and substantial
reliance generally required under Section 90 also screens for seriously consid-
ered promises. 4 A promisor who can foresee definite and substantial reliance
is likely to be careful about making a promise.
The consideration doctrine and Section 90 have a common remedial
implication as well as a common screening function. If a promise is identified
as serious through a finding of either consideration or a prospect of definite and
substantial reliance, the court will enforce it. In our system, enforcing a promise
generally means awarding expectancy relief.' 5
Although many commentators, and the Second Restatement itself, regard
reliance as an appropriate measure of relief, courts routinely award specific
11. See infra text accompanying notes 46-48 (discussion of difference between expectation and reliance
damages).
12. Individuals may be held liable for causing harm by statements that do not satisfy the requirements
set out by courts for a § 90 promise. Examples include defective or unproven promises and negligent
misrepresentations that induce another to rely to her detriment. See, e.g., D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of
Directors of Notre Dame High Sch., 520 A.2d 217 (Conn. 1987) (no liability under § 90 because no promise
made, but possible liability for negligent misrepresentation). The theory of liability in such cases derives
from the tort concept of compensation for harm rather than from the contractual principle of enforcing
promises on which § 90 is based. See infra text accompanying notes 360-63.
13. See 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 11, at 496 (1963) ("The existence of some
kinds of consideration may evidence an intention to be legally bound or a serious intention to keep the
promise."); James B. Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 13 HARv. L. REV. 29,42 (1899) (requirement
of consideration "gives the formality needed as a safeguard against thoughtless gratuitous promises"); Lon
L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUm. L. REV. 799-800 (1941) (formality may serve cautionary
function, as does consideration).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 84-100.
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8,
§14-4, at 591-92; FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.1, at 839-40.
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performance or expectation damages in Section 90 cases.' 6 Faced with the
primacy of expectancy relief in the courts and the prevailing reliance theory
of Section 90, some commentators conclude that contract law is incoherent. t7
Others have tried to explain the primacy of expectation with theories of Sec-
tion 90 that fail to address many of the reported cases, including those cases
that led to the promulgation of Section 90 in the first place.18 This Article
offers a coherent and inclusive explanation of the Section 90 cases, albeit one
that may be in keeping with what was once considered an entirely conventional,
promise-based view of contract law.
Section 90 reflects the legal realist's recognition that the best way to
understand law is to analyze what courts are doing instead of trying to force
cases into accepted theories.19 In particular, Section 90 recognizes that courts
often enforce promises in the absence of a bargain. Ironically, soon after
escaping the shackles of bargain theory, scholars embraced a reliance theory
of Section 90 that does not conform to the reality of the reported cases. This
Article shows that the original cases on which Section 90 was based and the
more recent cases that purport to follow it are best explained by an old concep-
tion of contract law: courts respond to an impulse to enforce serious promises.
Our thesis is not that the basis of Section 90 ought to be promise. Rather,
we describe and analyze the reported cases and show that the basis of the
16. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Promissory Estoppel Damages, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 131, 163 (1987)
("[I]n donative cases, courts routinely afford full enforcement. In commercial, contract-based cases,
expectation damages are similarly available provided that expectation damages would be available under
normal limits on expectation damages."); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory
Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 909 (1985) ("[Rleliance
plays little role in the determination of remedies [under § 90] .... [R]ecent cases are heavily weighted
towards the award of full expectation damages." (citations omitted)); Feinman, supra note 7, at 687-88 (in
§ 90 cases, availability of specific performance is same as in bargain cases and typical damages remedy
is expectation damages); cf. JOHN E. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 66, at 283 (3d ed. 1990) ("[lIt
is clear that the typical recovery protects the expectation interest, i.e., full enforcement of the prom-
ise .... ).
17. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 7.
18. See, e.g., Farber & Matheson, supra note 16. Their theory-that § 90 works to enforce promises
made in furtherance of economic activity-requires that donative promises be ignored and that charitable
pledges be regarded as furthering economic activity. See id. at 930, 937.
19. See Karl L. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1222 (1931).
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Section 90
section is promise." Because Section 90 conventionally is viewed as the
archetypical reliance provision, our conclusions support the claim that the law
of contracts is generally based instead on promise." Conversely, our findings
undermine the contention that contract law is being absorbed into a general
theory of civil liability based on the tort concept of compensation for harm.'
If contract were dead (or dying), signs of rigor mortis would surely appear in
the cases decided under Section 90.13 But the governing principle of
Section 90 in the courts is promise, and the central importance of promise
shows that contract remains a vital theory of obligation distinct from tort.
Although our primary objective is to describe and analyze the cases, our
conclusions may have important implications for the normative debate between
promise and reliance theorists because a normative legal theory derives part of
its strength from application and acceptance by the courts. Those who contend
that reliance ought to be the basis of contract need to explain why their argu-
ments have failed to persuade judges to resolve cases arising under the arche-
typical reliance provision in accordance with reliance principles.'
I. A HISTORY OF SECTION 90
The Second Restatement of Contracts revised Section 90 of the First
Restatement in three major respects.' First, it eliminated the requirement that
20. A person's interpretation of a case may reflect normative bias. The reader may wonder, therefore,
whether our description and analysis of the § 90 cases may be affected by a normative judgment favoring
promise over reliance. We discuss in detail in the text virtually all of the leading cases that are said to
support reliance, allowing the reader to evaluate the validity of our interpretations. For what it's worth, we
are not aware that we favor promise on normative grounds. In fact, we both believe that any harm suffered
in reliance on a promise is a powerful reason for judicial intervention. Moreover, before beginning research
for this Article, we both assumed (erroneously, as it turns out)-and taught in our contracts classes-that
the basis of § 90 is reliance.
That said, we recognize that others may read some of the cases discussed herein as support for a
reliance theory of § 90 or as neutral on the choice between reliance and promise. We believe, however,
that the evidence presented herein is so extensive and compelling that whatever the effect of possible
normative bias in reading particular cases, our conclusion that the basis of § 90 in the courts is promise
is correct.
21. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981) (stating a promissory view of
contracts).
22. See generally GILMORE, supra note 9 (classical view of contract law superseded by tort-related
principles).
23. Professor Grant Gilmore used § 90 as a paradigm for his theory that contract law is being absorbed
into a general theory of civil liability based primarily on tort-related concepts. Id. at 69-72, 89-90. Gilmore
contended that § 90 is based on a principle of reliance that "has, in effect, swallowed up the bargain
principle of § 75 [of the First Restatement]." Id. at 72. This Article concludes that § 90 (like § 75) is based
on promissory principles very different from the tort concept of compensation for harm.
24. The classic and most influential analysis of contract law in terms of reliance is Fuller & Perdue,
supra note 8. Among Fuller and Perdue's contemporary successors, Professor Patrick Atiyah has presented
the most complete and sophisticated arguments for reliance as the basis of contract. See P.S. ATIYAH,
ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 79-91 (1986); P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW 66-68, 202-15 (1981);
ATIYAH, supra note 9, at 764-79.
25. See supra note 1 (quoting both Restatements). The Second Restatement also changed the First
Restatement by allowing a third person's reliance to serve as a ground for enforcing a § 90 promise. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(l) (1981). For an analysis of the changes in § 90 wrought
1991]
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the action or forbearance foreseen by the promisor and induced by the promise
be "of a definite and substantial character." 26 Second, it provided that "[tihe
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires."'27 Third, it
added a new subsection providing that "[a] charitable subscription or a marriage
settlement is binding ... without proof that the promise induced action or
forbearance." These changes illuminate the respective theories of the First
and Second Restatements regarding enforcement of promises in the absence of
a bargain. To understand the importance of these changes, it is necessary to
analyze the reasons for the original provision in the First Restatement and the
explanations given for the revisions in the Second.
A. The Remedy for Breach
During the 1926 proceedings of the American Law Institute, a member of
the audience asked Professor Samuel Williston, the reporter for the First
Restatement of Contracts, about the following hypothetical. Uncle, aware that
Nephew is thinking about buying a car, promises to give Nephew $1000.
Nephew buys a car for $600. If Uncle reneges on his promise and Nephew
sues, what does the Nephew recover, $1000 or $600? Williston responded that
Uncle would be liable for $1,000, the amount of his promise.29 Although
Williston's response satisfied the immediate questioner,3" Frederic Coudert,
the famous New York lawyer, challenged Williston's answer in an exchange
that has since become one of the most quoted passages in American contract
law:
MR. COUDERT: Allow me to trespass once more, Mr. Reporter,
by asking this question. Please let me see if I understand it rightly.
Would you say, Mr. Reporter, in your case of Johnny and the uncle,
the uncle promising the $1000 and Johnny buying the car-say, he
goes out and buys the car for $500-that uncle would be liable for
$1000 or would he be liable for $500?
MR. WILLISTON: If Johnny had done what he was expected to
do, or is acting within the limits of his uncle's expectation, I think the
uncle would be liable for $1000; but not otherwise.
MR. COUDERT: In other words, substantial justice would require
that uncle should be penalized in the sum of $500.
MR. WILLISTON: Why do you say "penalized"?....
by the Second Restatement, see Knapp, supra note 5, at 55-6 1.
26. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
28. Id.
29. See Proceedings at Fourth Annual Meeting, 4 A.L.I. PROC. 95-96 (1926) [hereinafter 1926
Proceedingsl.
30. See id.
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MR. COUDERT: Because substantial justice there would require,
it seems to me, that Johnny get his money for his car, but should he
get his car and $500 more? I don't see."
Coudert's bewilderment was shared by other members of the audience, who
returned repeatedly to the car hypothetical:
HOMER ALBERS (Massachusetts): I am still not satisfied that
Johnny could have the car and $500 both, if he bought a second-hand
Buick for $500 .... 32
JUDGE PAGE: To get back to Johnny, how is injustice going to
be done Johnny if he is not going to get the other $500; how is he
going to be done an injustice, if he only paid $500 for the car?33
In the face of this assault, Williston stood his ground:
MR. WILLISTON: Either the promise is binding or it is not. If the
promise is binding it has to be enforced as it is made.' 4
Subsequent authorities generally have sided with Williston's critics, often
expressing their disagreement with Williston in terms more forceful than
Coudert's.35 Professor Melvin Eisenberg, for example, describes the remedial
outcome endorsed by Williston as "apparently extraordinary," "seem[ingly]
counterintuitive," and an example of "the extreme conceptualism of which
[Williston] was occasionally capable. '36 By identifying Williston's response
with "conceptualism," Eisenberg places the exchange at the center of the debate
31. Id. at 98-99.
32. Id. at 101.
33. Id. at 103.
34. Id.
35. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-6, at 290 (Williston's "overly conceptual approach
[to the remedy for breach] has very likely hindered full judicial acceptance of the doctrine" of promissory
estoppel); Boyer, supra note 8, at 487 (" njustice... is avoided when [the promiseel is protected to the
extent of his expenditures made in reliance upon the gratuitous promise."); Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 24-25
(result endorsed by Williston is "apparently extraordinary" and "seem[s] counterintuitive"); Fuller & Perdue,
supra note 8, at 64 (most arguments for expectation damages do not apply to nonbargain promises); Metzger
& Phillips, supra note 8, at 499 ("[Tlhe injustice to the promisor wrought by fully enforcing the promise
in such cases may have retarded the utilization of promissory estoppel."); Seavey, supra note 8, at 926
("Damages should not exceed the loss caused by the change of position ...."); Shattuck, supra note 8,
at 944 n.l10 ("[Dlamages should ... be restricted to a sum which will reimburse the promisee for his
expenditures ... attending his reliance on the promise."); Comment, Once More into the Breach: Promissory
Estoppel and Traditional Damage Doctrine, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 559, 563 (1970) ("Williston's view...
seemed to sacrifice common sense to theoretical consistency ... .
36. See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 24.
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during the 1920's between formalism and legal realism. 37 Williston's insis-
tence that the promise is either binding or not invites the response that the
extent to which the promise should be enforced depends on the reason for
judicial intervention." If the reason is to protect the promisee's reliance inter-
est, the remedy should be limited to reliance damages measured by the cost of
the car (presumably less its resale value).39
Sensitive analysis of Williston's comments in their entirety reveals, howev-
er, that his view about the appropriate remedy for breach was a product not of
rigid formalism,' but of a conception of Section 90 radically different from
that of his critics. To them, Section 90 protects the promisee's reliance inter-
est.41 To Williston, Section 90 enforces certain types of promises. Although
Williston described justifiable reliance by the promisee as the "binding thread
of principle" in the cases,42 he did not regard protecting reliance as the ulti-
mate objective of Section 90.43 Rather, reliance joins with the other require-
ments laid out in Section 90 to make a promise enforceable.'l Where the
critics focus on the behavior of the promisee and on the harm she has suffered,
Williston repeatedly emphasized the promisor and the promise made:
I should be of the opinion that it was unjust under the circumstances
... for the promisor not to do what he said he would.
.... [T]his section covers a case where there is a promise to give
and the promisor knows that the promisee will rely on the proposed
gift in certain definite ways.
.... [T]he proposition is that the court should enforce the prom-
ise.
37. See WILLiAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 26-83 (1973) (survey
of rise of legal realism during period from 1870 to 1931).
38. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 53-66 (analysis of the policies served by contract remedies);
cf. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 32 ("Relied-upon donative promises should be enforced to the extent of the
reliance.").
39. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 26 (nephew's financial loss is the difference between the cost of the
car and its resale value); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at 100 ("If... the ground of the promisee's
recovery were regarded as the reliance interest, it would seem appropriate to limit recovery to the value
of that interest-the cost to the promisee of the detriment that the promisee incurred in reliance on the
promise.").
40. Cf. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1406, 1456-57 (1987) (Williston's views on promissory estoppel exhibit signs of "legal realism" and
"liberality").
41. See sources cited supra note 8.
42. Commentaries on Contracts Restatement No. 2, 4 A.L.I. PROc. 19-20 (1926) (remarks of Samuel
Williston, Reporter) [hereinafter Commentaries].
43. That Williston did not regard protecting reliance as the ultimate objective of § 90 is illustrated by
his insistence that reliance alone, even if substantial, would not be sufficient to entitle the promisee to relief.
See Commentaries, supra note 42, at 20; 1926 Proceedings, supra note 29, at 92-93.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 76-77, 88-89, 93-100 (under Williston's view, promisor should
reasonably foresee reliance of a definite and substantial character for promise to be enforceable).
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Either the promise is binding or it is not. If the promise is binding
it has to be enforced as it is made.
.... [T]he question of damages for breach of a promise is ordi-
narily such a sum that will put the promisee in as good a position as
he would have been in if the promise had been kept, not as good a
position as he would have been in if the promise had not been
made.. .4
The rejection of Williston's conception of Section 90 by many commenta-
tors may be due in large part to the publication in 1936 of Fuller and Perdue's
seminal article on contract damages.4 6 Fuller and Perdue analyzed contract
remedies in terms of three interests of the promisee: restitution, reliance, and
expectation. Restitution entitles the promisee to recapture a benefit to which
the promisor is not entitled in light of her breach; reliance damages compensate
the promisee for actual harm caused by the promise; expectation damages put
the promisee in the same position as if the promise had been kept. 7 According
to Fuller and Perdue, the promisee's claim to expectation damages is the
weakest. These damages, they argue, go beyond compensating for an actual loss
or stripping the promisor of unjust enrichment, to placing the promisee in a
better position than the one she was in before the promise was made.48
Despite placing expectation damages at the bottom of the remedial hierar-
chy, Fuller and Perdue recognized that the normal measure of recovery for
breach of contract was expectation damages.49 They offered two principal
explanations for this phenomenon. First, expectation damages may serve as a
surrogate for measuring reliance in the form of foregone opportunities50 If,
for example, the promisee could have obtained another contract on similar
terms, expectation damages are justifiable because they compensate for the loss
suffered by the promisee in passing up the other deal. Second, expectation
damages further a policy of encouraging and facilitating reliance on business
transactions, with the result that economic activity is generally stimulated."'
Reliance would be discouraged-and the policy of stimulating economic
activity threatened-if promisees were limited to recovering reliance damages
for breach of promise.52
45. 1926 Proceedings, supra note 29, at 87, 89, 91, 103, 111-12.
46. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8.
47. Id. at 53-54.
48. Id. at 56-57; see also Becker, supra note 16, at 142.
49. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 57.
50. Id. at 60-61.
51. Id. at 61; see also JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFrS AND PROMISES 221 (1980) ("[A] sufficient reason for
enforcing a promise is that it is part of an agreed exchange which would enable each party to secure from
the other an act or result that he sought.").
52. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 61-62.
1991]
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As Fuller and Perdue noted, 3 their analysis leaves little room for expecta-
tion damages in the context of a Section 90 that was originally conceived as
a mechanism for enforcing donative promises5" Economic utility is difficult
to discern in donative promises because the parties are not engaged in the
exchanges "by which production is organized in a capitalistic society. 5
Moreover, because the promisee by definition is not exchanging anything for
the promise, she typically will not have given up another deal in reliance on
the promise.5 6 Although there may be instances in which the promisee's reli-
ance on a gratuitous promise assumes nonquantifiable forms justifying expecta-
tion damages as a surrogate for measuring reliance5 7 Fuller and Perdue's
analysis leads to the conclusion that the proper remedy under Section 90 is
reliance whenever, as in the car example, the amount of the promisee's loss
can be quantified.5
Since the publication of Fuller and Perdue's article, it has become conven-
tional to view contract remedies in terms of the promisee's interests in the
remedy awarded.5 9 Fuller and Perdue's pervasive influence is shown most
dramatically by the first section dealing with remedies in the Second Restate-
ment of Contracts. Entitled "Purposes of Remedies," it lays out the three
interests of the promisee identified in the Fuller and Perdue article,6° which
53. See id. at 64 ("Most of the arguments for the rule measuring damages by the expectancy which
we developed.., have no application to" § 90 promises.).
54. See Commentaries, supra note 42, at 16-19 (review of nonbargain cases making it necessary to
adopt§ 90 of the FirstRestatement); 1926 Proceedings, supra note 29, at 106-07 (remarks of Prof. Williston
to same effect); Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract
Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443,449 (1987) (§ 90 originally "limited to non-
bargain promises in donative settings"); Feinman, supra note 7, at 680 ("Section 90 was abstracted ... as
a substitute for consideration to ameliorate the Restatement's strict bargain requirement in a limited class
of cases involving gratuitous promises." (footnote omitted)).
55. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 65; cf. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 4 ("It is far from clear
that any independent social interests are implicated by [donative] promises."). Judge Richard Posner has
argued that enforcement of gratuitous promises improves efficiency by increasing the value of the promise
to the promisee at no cost to the sincere promisor. See Richard Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Law and
Economics, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 411-12 (1977). Professor Jeffrey Harrison has questioned whether
efficiency concerns have affected judicial decisions in the context of promissory estoppel. See Jeffrey
Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation of Economic Analysis in Contract Law, 1988 ANN.
REV. AM. L. 73, 86-88.
56. See Becker, supra note 16, at 135-36; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 65; Comment, supra note
35, at 568.
57. See Becker, supra note 16, at 139; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 26-31.
58. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 64-65.
59. For examples of discussions of remedies under § 90 that are influenced by Fuller and Perdue, see
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-6, at 291; Becker, supra note 16, at 140-44; Boyer, supra note
8, at 462; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1-2. Even those commentators who find that expectation damages
are routinely granted under § 90 seem compelled to reconcile that outcome with Fuller and Perdue's analysis.
See, e.g., Becker, supra note 16, at 140-44.
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981). The approach of the SecondRestatement
represents a significant change from the First Restatement, which did not recognize the reliance interest.
See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 89-90, 400-01.
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is prominently cited in the reporter's note following the section.6' The section
presumes that the sole purpose of contract remedies is to protect interests of
the promisee. In keeping with this presumption, the Second Restatement added
language allowing courts to limit the remedy in Section 90 cases,62 thereby
sanctioning the award of reliance damages.3 If contract remedies serve to
protect interests of the promisee and if the promisee's claim under Section 90
derives from injury to her reliance interest, the remedy awarded ought to be
limited to reliance damages.6r
Contract remedies look entirely different, however, when viewed from the
perspective of the promisor. With this shift in focus come very different
conclusions regarding the proper remedy for breach. Professor Charles Fried
is the most recent expositor of a promisor-based approach to contract remedies.
Fried explains much of contract law in terms of the moral obligation of prom-
ise.65 His primary focus is on the promisor, who has an interest in requiring
that promises be kept so that others will take her at her word. By enforcing
contracts, the legal system supports principles of trust and integrity.66 From
this perspective, Fried concludes that the proper remedy for breach of contract
is expectation damages that put the promisee in the same position in which she
would have been had the promisor kept her word.67
Fuller and Fried offer radically different explanations of contract reme-
dies.68 For the purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to choose between
them. It is important to recognize, however, that Williston, with his emphasis
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 reporter's note (1981); see also E. Allan Farnsworth,
Some Prefatory Remarks: From Rules to Standards, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 634, 635 (1982) (acknowledging
influence of Fuller and Perdue on § 344).
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).
63. See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 26 (purpose of added sentence in § 90 was to sanction use of
reliance damages); Knapp, supra note 5, at 55 (language permitting remedy to be limited is "a response
to numerous writers over the years who have differed with Professor Williston's assertion that a promise
enforced under Section 90 ... must be enforceable... to the full extent of the promised expectation").
64. See W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 197,236
(1990) ("[Alttempts to replace the expectation measure with the reliance measure ... equate the measure
of compensation with the grounds for enforcement .... "). Although the logic of its position leads to the
conclusion in the text, the SecondRestatement does not fully endorse reliance damages as the normal remedy
in § 90 cases. Instead, in what appears to be a concession to reported decisions, the Restatement comments
that "[al promise under this section is a contract, and full-scale enforcement by normal remedies is often
appropriate." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. d (1981); see infra text accompanying
note 174.
65. See FRIED, supra note 21, at 14-17.
66. See id. at 15-17.
67. See id. at 17-21. Given Fried's emphasis on promise, it is curious that he seems to accept the view
that § 90 is based on detrimental reliance. His acceptance of this position may be due to a misconception
that the cases under § 90 tend to award reliance damages. See id. at 25; see infra text accompanying note
278. Fried's error may also reflect a failure to recognize that § 90 of the First Restatement contains standards
for imposing liability which are more consistent with his own promise principle than with a theory of
detrimental reliance. See infra text accompanying notes 97-100.
68. That Fuller and Perdue almost entirely overlooked the promisor in formulating their theory of
contract remedies appears most clearly in their discussion of the expectation interest, in which the explana-
tions they gave for the prevalence of expectancy relief derive solely from interests of society and of the
promisee. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 57-63.
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on promise and on the promisor, was proceeding from premises much more
akin to Fried's than to Fuller and Perdue's. This is not to say that Williston
conceptualized Section 90 primarily in terms of a moral obligation of promise.
The key to Williston's position is found instead in the first sentence of the 1925
proceedings of the American Law Institute on the Restatement of Contracts in
which Williston states: "The endeavor in this Restatement is to restate the law
as it is, not as a new law."69 Applying this principle to Section 90, Williston
knew he was on firm ground in insisting that the remedy for breach was
expectation damages or specific performance because the reported cases so held.
While the critics repeatedly contended that the nephew should be limited to
damages measured by the cost of the car, Williston was equally persistent in
noting that the cases held otherwise.70 If the Restatement was meant to restate
the law, how could Section 90 provide for reliance damages when the remedy
awarded by courts was either specific performance or expectation damages?
Although Williston's defense of expectation damages was based on the
reported decisions, he almost certainly would have defended expectation
damages on normative grounds as well. Thus, he disagreed with Coudert's
contention that to enforce a Section 90 promise with expectancy relief would
be to penalize the promisor, and he insisted that "[e]ither the promise is binding
or it is not."71 Williston also distinguished between actions grounded in prom-
ise and actions based on equitable estoppel or deceit.72 For breach of promise,
the defendant may be liable even in the absence of misrepresentation at the time
of the promise.73 By contrast, equitable estoppel or deceit is based on the
defendant's misrepresentation of fact independent of her promise.74 As a reme-
dy for equitable estoppel or deceit, damages measured by the harm suffered by
the plaintiff might be appropriate; for breach of promise, Williston believed that
the remedy was properly based on the promise, i.e., specific performance of
69. See Proceedings at Third Annual Meeting, 3 A.L.I. PROC. 159 (1925) [hereinafter 1925 Proceed-
ings].
70. See 1926 Proceedings, supra note 29, at 99, 104, 112.
71. Id. at 103; see supra text accompanying note 34.
72. See 1926 Proceedings, supra note 29, at 89-90 (remarks of Prof. Williston) ("I should like to
confine the meaning of the word [estoppel] to a misrepresentation of some fact that was relied upon. There
is no misrepresentation of fact here; there is simply a gratuitous promise .... ").
73. See id. at 93 (remarks of Prof. Williston) ("To call a promise deceit merely because the promisor,
although intending to keep it when he makes [it], afterwards decides not to, is to my mind a misuse of
language.").
74. See 1925 Proceedings, supra note 69, at 166 (remarks of Prof. Williston) ("If they simply make
a statement that they are true, then it is within the doctrine of estoppel; I should define estoppel as a
misrepresentation of fact on which the other party justifiably relies .... ).
Some of the cases decided before the promulgation of § 90 invoked the doctrine of equitable estoppel
to hold the promisor liable for what would now be called promissory estoppel. See, e.g., Ricketts v.
Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898). One commentator attributes the misapplication of equitable estoppel
in these cases to the absence of a recognized doctrine of promissory estoppel. See MURRAY, supra note
16, § 66(A)(1), at 274-75.
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the promise itself or expectation damages measured by the value of the prom-
ise.75
B. The Requirements of Foreseeability, Definiteness, and Substantiality
Williston recognized that not all promises, nor even all relied-upon promis-
es, were enforceable.76 His task was to circumscribe the scope of Section 90
so that it covered only those nonbargain promises courts would enforce. The
original Section 90 sought to accomplish this objective in three ways: first, the
promise must be such that the promisor should reasonably expect it to induce
action or forbearance by the promisee; second, the action or forbearance
expected must be "of a definite and substantial character"; third, the promise
must actually induce such action or forbearance.77
Subsequent commentators have criticized the first two limitations.71 Pro-
fessor Eisenberg would scrap the requirement that the reliance be within the
reasonable expectation of the promisor in favor of a rule that would make any
reasonable reliance compensable.79 Eisenberg prefers this rule in part because
it shifts attention away from "the contours of the promise-breaker's expecta-
tion" and toward "the reasonableness of the innocent promisee's reliance."8 0
As Eisenberg points out, his revision would not affect the outcome of many
cases." If the promisee's reliance is reasonable, it is likely also to be within
the reasonable contemplation of the promisor. But it is certainly possible to
conceive of cases in which the outcome would vary depending on the rule
applied. Suppose, for example, that Uncle promises miserly Nephew $1000.
If Uncle has a reputation for keeping his word, it may be reasonable for
Nephew to rely on the promise by buying a new automobile. Given Nephew's
reputation for miserliness, however, his spending rather than saving the $1000
may not be reasonably expected by Uncle. Eisenberg would enforce the promise
75. Although Williston emphasized the distinction between promise and equitable estoppel or deceit,
the connection between this distinction and the remedy awarded for each wrong was made most forcefully
by a questioner who agreed with Williston's conclusion that expectation damages ought to be the measure
of recovery under § 90:
MR. TUNSTALL: That is how I should interpret it, because otherwise the point made by
Mr. Coudert would limit recovery to the price of the Ford and so also an action of deceit would
limit it to the price of a Ford; but if it is a promise and the promise is binding, the uncle would
be bound for $1000 irrespective of the detriment suffered by the promisee.
1926 Proceedings, supra note 29, at 96 (remarks of R. Tunstall).
76. See Commentaries, supra note 42, at 20 ("There are numerous cases in which [justifiable reliance
of the promisee] is held not sufficient to make a gratuitous promise binding."); 1926 Proceedings, supra
note 29, at 97 (remarks of Prof. Williston) ("There is no broad doctrine that wherever a man makes a
promise, a gratuitous promise, and the other relies upon it, the promisee can recover on the promise.").
77. See RFSTATEmENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
78. See Boyer, supra note 8, at 478-79; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 20-23; Fuller & Perdue, supra note
8, at 420.
79. See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 20-21.
80. See id. at 21.
81. See id.
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(at least to the extent of the Nephew's reliance). Under Williston's formulation
and under the First Restatement, the Nephew would not be compensated82
because his reliance was not within the reasonable expectation of the promi-
sor.
83
Cases like this are unusual, however, and the issue might not be worth
pursuing if not for what it says about the huge theoretical gulf separating
Williston and his critics. If the objective of Section 90 is to protect reliance,
then reasonable reliance alone justifies a remedy. But if, as Williston believes,
the goal of Section 90 is to enforce certain nonbargain promises, it is critical
to provide standards for determining which promises should be enforced.
The framework set out in the First Restatement is best understood by
bearing in mind that Section 90 has the effect of eliminating the requirement
of bargained-for consideration.' But Section 90 ensures that some of the func-
tions of the bargain requirement are served in other ways. Among other things,
the presence of a bargain helps to identify promises on which the promisor has
seriously reflected.85 If she made the promise to get something in return, her
promise was sufficiently well considered to justify legal enforcement.86 By
contrast, donative promises may be made impulsively.87 Section 90 identifies
well-considered donative promises for enforcement by requiring that reliance
be within the reasonable expectation of the promisor, thereby distinguishing
between relatively casual promises and promises that, precisely because reliance
by the promisee is expected, are likely to be more serious; a promise-based law
of contracts would enforce only the latter."
82. The point in the text is confirmed by Williston's discussion of a hypothetical in which an uncle
promises his nephew $1000 expecting that the nephew will invest the gift. 1926 Proceedings, supra note
29, at 93. Williston concludes that if the nephew instead spends the money by launching "into high life,"
he would not be compensated, because the uncle did not reasonably foresee this action by the nephew in
reliance on the promise. Id.; see also Commentaries, supra note 42, at 20 ("action should reasonably have
been expected by the promisor" for promise to be enforceable).
83. Even if the nephew was a spendthrift rather than a miser, he would not be compensated under the
First Restatement because, while the uncle could anticipate that the nephew would spend the $1000, the
uncle did not reasonably expect particular action by the nephew in reliance on the promise. See Commen-
taries, supra note 42, at 20 ("A promise of a thousand dollars generally without specification of the purpose
will not bind the promisor.").
84. See Feinman, supra note 7, at 680 ("Section 90 was abstracted.., as a substitute for consideration
to ameliorate the Restatement's strict bargain requirement.").
85. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
Another function of the consideration requirement is evidentiary. See Fuller, supra note 13, at 800.
If the promisor obtained something in an exchange, it is likely that she actually made a promise. See Melvin
A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 744 (1982). The evidentiary
function of the bargain is replaced in § 90 by the fact that the promisee relied in a substantial manner,
making it more likely that a promise was made. See infra text accompanying notes 331-32.
86. See FRIED, supra note 21, at 38 ("Requiring an exchange increases the chance that the parties had
in contemplation serious business with serious consequences.").
87. See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 5; Fuller, supra note 13, at 799; Henderson, supra note 7, at 346.
88. Traditionally, a promise in a writing under seal was enforceable without consideration. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.16, at 86; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 8. Like the § 90 requirements of
foreseeability, definiteness, and substantiality, the formality of a writing under seal serves a cautionary
function by alerting the promisor to the seriousness of her promise. See FARNSWORTHt, supra note 4, § 2.16,
at 87; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 8-9; Fuller, supra note 13, at 800.
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For Williston and the First Restatement, it was not enough that the reliance
be reasonably foreseeable; the expected action or forbearance also had to be
"of a definite and substantial character." 9 Subsequent critics find the language
"definite and substantial" problematic, primarily because in their view the
nature and degree of the promisee's reliance matters only in computing damag-
es.' Both requirements have been eliminated from the Second Restatement.
Professor Braucher, the reporter for the Second Restatement, justified this
change on the ground (among others) that "the requirement of reliance of a
definite and substantial character becomes doubtful" with the addition of a
second sentence in Section 90 allowing courts to limit the remedy awarded as
justice requires.9'
Once again, the critics proceed from a different perspective than Williston's
and, not surprisingly, reach a different conclusion. If Section 90 is designed to
protect reliance, they argue, there is no reason to require that the reliance be
definite and substantial. Any reliance should be protected; if indefinite or
insubstantial, it will be compensated accordingly.92 But Williston's discussion
of the language "definite and substantial" focused on the promisor, not on the
promisee. For Williston, the requirements of definiteness and substantiality
served not to mark the level of reliance that deserved protection,93 but to
establish the level of foreseeable consequences that would justify holding the
promisor to her promise:
[Definite and substantial] action should reasonably have been expected
by the promisor .... [I]t will not be enough that some action of the
Other legal systems have adopted different methods for ensuring that a donative promise is well
considered. Under German law, for example, a promise to make a gift becomes enforceable and irrevocable
if the promise is notarized in a formal ceremony before a public official. DAWSON, supra note 51, at 226.
Like the requirements of § 90, the German notarization procedure serves to ensure deliberation and informed
assent by the promisor. See id.
89. See Commentaries, supra note 42, at 20; 1926 Proceedings, supra note 29, at 90.
90. See 1A CORBIN, supra note 13, § 200, at 217 ('The more free and flexible the court is willing to
be in determining the extent of the recovery, the more variation is made possible in applying such a
requirement as that the action in reliance must be 'substantial."'); Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 21-22 ("If
a donative promisee's reliance is nontrivial... how could the law justifiably refuse to enforce the promise,
at least to the extent of the reliance?"); Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 420 ('This problem ... permits
of a more rational answer... than to say, as Section 90 of the Restatement... asks us to say: 'Either your
losses must have been so great as to justify us in enforcing the whole promise, or you go without reme-
dy."'). But see Knapp, supra note 5, at 59 ("In the light of the important policies underlying consideration
and form, a court might well require ... that the plaintiff seeking enforcement demonstrate reliance that
is both definite and substantial." (footnotes omitted)).
91. See Proceedings at Forty-second Annual Meeting, 42 A.L.L PROC. 296 (1965) [hereinafter 1965
Proceedings]; see also CALAmARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-1, at 273 ("[P]remise of full recovery...
is probably the reason for including in [original § 901 the provisions for definite and substantial reliance.").
92. See CALAdARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-1, at 273 (provision for flexible remedy contributed
to omission of "definite and substantial" clause); Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 22 ("How could the law
justifiably refuse to enforce the promise, at least to the extent of the reliance?").
93. The point in the text is demonstrated by Williston's insistence that even substantial reliance would
not make a promise enforceable if the promisor did not reasonably foresee the particular action in reliance
that resulted. See Commentaries, supra note 42, at 20; 1926 Proceedings, supra note 29, at 93.
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promisee, even if [of] substantial character[,] has been induced by the
promise.94
[T]his section covers a case where there is a promise to give and
the promisor knows that the promisee will rely upon the proposed gift
in certain definite ways.
.... The uncle should certainly expect that the next thing that
would happen would be that Johnny would run around the corner to
the Buick agency and get a car and perhaps sign some promissory
notes for it.
We have confined the Section to the case where a reasonable
person would say that the promisor expected the man to do just what
he did or that he ought to have expected it.95
Because his objective was to enforce certain types of promises, not to protect
reliance, Williston rejected the view that "any reliance on a gratuitous promise
will render the promise enforceable. . .96 For Williston, the problem was to
identify those promises that ought to be enforced. His solution was to require
that the promisor reasonably expect her promise to induce action or forbearance
of a definite and substantial character.
Of the two limitations, the more revealing is the requirement of definite-
ness. If solicitude for the promisee were the primary concern of Section 90, it
would be hard to justify a requirement that the promisor foresee the particular
act in reliance, 97 as the word "definite" requires. 98 Any reliance-or at least
any nontrivial reliance-would be sufficient to justify requiring the promisor
to compensate the promisee for the harm suffered. But requiring that the
promisor foresee the particular act in reliance helps to ensure that Section 90
comes into play only when the seriousness of her promise was apparent to the
promisor.
The requirement of substantiality may be read in the same vein: rather than
justifying enforcement on the degree of a promisee's reliance, it helps instead
to identify promises that the promisor understood might have serious conse-
94. Commentaries, supra note 42, at 20.
95. 1926 Proceedings, supra note 29, at 89, 91, 93.
96. Id. at 93 (emphasis added); see also Commentaries, supra note 42, at 20 (§ 90 "does not assert
a sweeping rule that in every case action in reliance is sufficient support for a promise"); 1926 Proceedings,
supra note 29, at 90 (remarks of Prof. Williston) ("[Tihere is the danger that the inference will be drawn
that wherever a promise is reasonably relied upon it becomes binding. That would go farther than Section
[901.").
97. See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 22 ("If the promisee relied, and the promisor should reasonably
have expected to induce reliance ... how could the law justifiably refuse to enforce the promise on the
ground that the promisor need not have expected the promisee to do 'just' what he did?").
98. See IA CORBIN, supra note 13, § 200, at 218 ("[Tihe promisor must have had reason to foresee
the definite action or forbearance that in fact followed.").
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quences.99 A promisor is less likely to make a promise casually if she expects
it to induce substantial action in reliance by the promisee.
Taken together, the words "definite and substantial" make clear what the
language of the First Restatement accomplishes: If the promisor made a
promise expecting it to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substan-
tial character, the promise was likely well considered and deserving of legal
enforcement. Thus, the "definite and substantial" clause in Section 90 of the
First Restatement serves the same cautionary function that reciprocity serves
in the context of bargains."°
During the American Law Institute proceedings on the Second Restatement,
Braucher did not discuss this explanation for the requirements of definiteness
and substantiality,' 0' and the fundamental change effected by deleting the
"definite and substantial" clause was not fully appreciated. As a measure of the
degree of the promisee's reliance, the words are unnecessary, as Braucher
argued. That objective can be served quite easily by calibrating the amount of
damages to reflect the nature and degree of reliance. But because the words
"definite and substantial" actually serve to evaluate the quality of the promi-
sor's commitment, their elimination from the Second Restatement is more
problematic from a normative perspective than Braucher seemed to
recognize. 0 2
Braucher gave a second reason for dropping the requirements of definite-
ness and substantiality. Because courts often enforce marriage settlements and
charitable subscriptions in the absence of definite and substantial reliance, it
seemed necessary to drop those requirements. 0 3 Still, the language of the
99. Williston did not expressly justify the substantiality requirement on the basis discussed in the text.
But his repeated emphasis on the promisor rather than on the promisee shows that he was not primarily
concerned with the degree of the promisee's reliance. Moreover, Williston discussed a hypothetical in which
he would deny recovery despite substantial reliance by the promisee because the promisor reasonably did
not expect that the promise would induce the action taken by the promisee. See 1926 Proceedings, supra
note 29, at 93; see also Commentaries, supra note 42, at 20 ("[lIt will not be enough that some action of
the promisee, even if [of] substantial character[,] has been induced by the promise.").
100. But see Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 18-19 ("The prospect of reliance may have a sobering effect
on the promisor, but since the motive is donative rather than calculating, a significant danger remains that
the promise was made without sufficient deliberation."). It is important to note again that the First Restate-
ment required much more than a "prospect of reliance" for a § 90 promise to be enforceable: the foreseen
action (or forbearance) had to be both definite and substantial. The combined requirements of foreseeability,
definiteness, and substantiality in the First Restatement certainly increase the likelihood that the promise
was well considered, and the elimination of these requirements, which Professor Eisenberg advocates, see
id. at 20-23, is likely to increase the risk that the promise was impulsive and ill considered.
101. Braucher's failure to discuss this explanation may have been due to the fact that leading commen-
tators read the "definite and substantial" language as marking the degree of reliance by the promisee that
deserved legal protection. See, e.g., Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 402 ("[The reliance must be so
'definite and substantial' as to justify an enforcement of the whole promise.").
102. It is also problematic in a descriptive sense, for the definite and substantial requirements still
generally reflect the reported cases. See cases cited infra note 344. For criticism of the decision to drop the
"definite and substantial" clause, see Knapp, supra note 5, at 58-59; see also MURRAY, supra note 16, §
66(B)(1), at 280 (new provision raises troublesome issue of whether court should enforce promise if reliance
is indefinite and insubstantial).
103. See 1965 Proceedings, supra note 91, at 289, 297.
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First Restatement is not wrong: a promise that meets its criteria is "binding,"
as the section states. The problem with the First Restatement is that it does not
go far enough. Charitable subscriptions are sometimes enforced even when the
promisor did not contemplate definite and substantial reliance."°
The more interesting and fundamental question is whether the enforcement
of nonbargain promises is based on reliance or on promise. The weakness of
reliance theory is demonstrated by a revealing exchange at the American Law
Institute proceedings on the Second Restatement. After Braucher gave his
reasons for dropping the words "definite and substantial," a member of the
audience pointed out that in the contexts of marriage settlements, charitable
subscriptions, and other gifts, courts often do not require any reliance whatsoev-
er. 5 He proposed, therefore, that Section 90 be revised to reflect the absence
of a requirement of actual reliance in the cases."° Braucher conceded that
there was a "certain fictitious quality" about the reliance in the cases and
thought the proposal "worth consideration."' 7 The result of further delibera-
tions was the addition of a second subsection providing that "[a] charitable
subscription or a marriage settlement is binding ... without proof that the
promise induced action or forbearance."' 0 8
This subsection was an admission that reliance was not the basis for
enforcing at least some Section 90 promises. 9 The new subsection also
revealed that elimination of the "definite and substantial" clause was neither
sufficient nor necessary to deal with the very cases that prompted the change.
The addition of this subsection left no reason to drop the requirements of
definiteness and substantiality in subsection 1110 (other than the mistaken view
that those requirements serve to mark the level of reliance that deserves protec-
tion). So long as charitable subscriptions and marriage settlements are governed
by the separate rule of subsection 2,"' Williston's original formula continues
to work quite well. Virtually every case in which a promise is enforced under
subsection 1 involves a promisor who should reasonably foresee particular,
substantial action (or forbearance) in reliance on the promise.12
104. See infra notes 348-49 and accompanying text.
105. See 1965 Proceedings, supra note 91, at 297 (remarks of Mr. Boskey).
106. See id.
107. Id. at 298 (remarks of Prof. Braucher); see also id. at 289 ('Reliance of a largely fictitious
character is upheld in many cases.").
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 287-92.
110. Cf. Knapp, supra note 5, at 59 n.50 ("Now that charitable cases are dealt with separately ... there
is even less reason to suggest that in ordinary cases under § 90 the court should be indifferent to the definite
or substantial character of the plaintiff's action in reliance.").
111. Unlike charitable pledges, marriage settlements arguably satisfy the foreseeability requirements
of the First Restatement because the promisor may foresee that the promisee might change her behavior
in reliance on the settlement. Although the promisee need not prove that the promise induced an actual
change of position, this is equally true of other subsection I promises. See infra text accompanying notes
287-312.
112. See cases cited infra note 344.
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The changes in the Second Restatement reflect a reliance-based view of
Section 90 that differs considerably from the promissory conception of the First
Restatement. The remainder of this Article establishes that the reported cases
support the First Restatement. This conclusion suggests that the drafters of the
Second Restatement, and reliance theorists generally, failed to heed the lessons
of legal realism. Realists have argued that courts should decide cases to further
social policies. They also have argued that courts in fact decide cases on that
basis, rather than on the basis of abstract doctrine.113 In the context of Sec-
tion 90, reliance advocates have overlooked the second point. Upon identifying
reliance as the reason for enforcing Section 90 promises, they have criticized
Williston (and implicitly the courts) as a rigid formalist for endorsing outcomes
that do not conform to reliance theory. But if courts decide cases on the basis
of policy rather than doctrine, it is important to identify the policy that moti-
vates courts in Section 90 cases. We find that courts respond to a policy of
enforcing serious promises.
II. THE REMEDY FOR BREACH OF A SECTION 90 PROMISE
[Als frequently happens in promissory estoppel cases, the value of the
plaintiff's detrimental reliance need not be identical with, or equated
to, the value of the defendant's promise. The cases hold that the
appropriate remedy lies in the enforcement of the defendant's promise.
The promise here ... consisted of the defendant's commitment that
it stood liable under the policy for the amount of the judgment against
the plaintiff. The measure of damages must therefore be the amount
of the judgment."1 4
This passage from a California opinion evidences what Williston discovered
and reported in the 1920's: the remedy routinely granted in Section 90 cases
is enforcement of the promise either by expectation damages or by specific
performance. The passage also supports Williston's simple explanation: for
breach of promise, the proper remedy is to put the promisee in the same
position in which she would have been had the promise been kept.
The Second Restatement and an array of academic commentators disagree
with Williston and the California opinion."5 They argue that a reliance mea-
sure of damages is appropriate in Section 90 cases because the promisee's right
of action is founded on detrimental reliance. In support of that proposition, they
113. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 166-67 (1930); Llewellyn, supra note 19;
A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal
Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 677-78 (198 1). These statements about legal realism must be understood
with the caveat that generalizations about the views of all realists are risky. See Llewellyn, supra note 19,
at 1233-34, 1254-56.
114. Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 394 P.2d 571, 578 (Cal. 1964).
115. See infra text accompanying notes 164-78.
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proffer cases in which courts awarded reliance damages for claims based on
Section 90.
This part examines the cases and concludes, with Williston, that the remedy
routinely granted is either specific performance or expectation damages. Those
rare instances in which courts award reliance damages involve either a problem
with the promise or a difficulty in assessing expectation damages." 6 Some
courts (like the California Supreme Court in the quoted passage) explain an
expectancy measure by expressly tying the remedy to the promise;" 7 more
often, courts grant specific performance or expectation damages without
analysis or discussion. 118 That courts enforce promises rather than compensate
reliance under Section 90 is powerful evidence that the basis of the section in
the courts is promise.
A. Expectation is the Routine Remedy under Section 90
1. The Reported Cases
Although the Second Restatement of Contracts sanctions reliance as the
measure of recovery in Section 90 cases, the cases it cites in explaining Sec-
tion 90 reveal that expectation is the normal measure of relief. The reporter's
note references twenty-nine cases in which the promisee was afforded re-
lief;n 9 twenty-four cases that awarded expectancy relief in the form of specif-
ic performance, expectation damages, or an injunction;2 ' and only five cases
116. When expectation damages are difficult to prove, courts often grant specific performance or an
injunction to ensure the promisee the benefit of the bargain. See EDWARD YORIO, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT:
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS § 2.4, at 36-37 (1989) (difficulty of proving damages is reason
to grant equitable relief). However, in the cases discussed infra in which reliance damages were awarded
under § 90 because expectation damages were not provable, specific performance also could not be granted
because the promise was too indefinite to be specifically enforced, see infra text accompanying notes 233-34,
242-43, or because the type of contract at issue was not specifically enforceable for reasons of public policy.
See YORIO, supra, § 14.4, at 378-79 (employment contracts generally not specifically enforceable against
employer); see also infra text accompanying notes 266-68 (discussion of cases involving employment
promises). Some of the cases involved employment contracts terminable at will, in which specific perform-
ance would be futile in any event because the employer might terminate the employment shortly after the
equitable decree issues. See YORIO, supra, § 5.5 (court will not order specific performance when promisor
has right of termination under contract).
117. See, e.g., Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
118. See, e.g., Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163
(Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 reporter's note (1981); see cases cited infra notes
120-21. In the remaining cases cited in the reporter's note, the courts refused to grant any relief. See infra
cases cited in notes 325-29.
120. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (specific performance of note); Janke
Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687 (W.D. Wis. 1974) (expectation damages), aff'd, 527
F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1976); Crail v. Blakely, 505 P.2d 1027 (Cal. 1973) (same); Burgess v. California Mut.
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 290 P. 1029 (Cal. 1930) (same); Graddon v. Knight, 292 P.2d 632 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1956) (same); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 144 A.2d 123 (Del. 1958) (same); Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974) (same); Miller v. Lawlor, 66 N.W.2d 267 (Iowa 1954) (injunction);
Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930) (specific performance); Devecmon v. Shaw, 14 A. 464 (Md.
1888) (expectation damages); McLearn v. Hill, 177 N.E. 617 (Mass. 1931) (specific performance of implied
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that awarded reliance damages or restitution.12 1 In the few cases granting a
nonexpectancy measure of relief, an award of expectation damages was inappro-
priate for one of the following reasons: there was no promise; the alleged
promise was not proved; the case was decided under a legal principle different
from breach of promise; or, expectation damages were difficult to prove."
Recent surveys confirm that expectancy is the routine measure of relief in
Section 90 cases." A 1984 canvass of cases decided during the preceding
fifteen years found that the typical monetary remedy was expectation damages
and that specific performance was granted whenever it would have been
available in a comparable cause of action involving a bargain.1" A 1985 sur-
vey of every case in the preceding ten years that cited Section 90 of either
Restatement found that five-sixths of the cases that addressed the issue of the
extent of recovery granted full expectation relief and only one-sixth limited
recovery to reliance damages.'t 5 A 1987 article concluded that courts routine-
promise not to plead statute of limitations); Huhala v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 N.W.2d 640 (Mich. 1977)
(defendant's promise specifically enforced to preclude statute-of-limitations defense); Lusk-Harbison-lones,
Inc. v. Universal Credit Co., 145 So. 623 (Miss. 1933) (plaintiff's promise specifically enforced to preclude
recovery); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (expectation damages); Ricketts
v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898) (same); Horsfield v. Gedicks, 118 A. 275 (N.J. Ch. 1922) (specific
performance), aff'd mem., 124 A. 925 (NJ. 1924); Spiegel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 160 N.E.2d 40
(N.Y. 1959) (expectation damages); Siegel v. Spear & Co., 138 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1923) (same); De Cicco
v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917) (same); Phalen v. United States Trust Co., 78 N.E. 943 (N.Y. 1906)
(specific performance); Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (expectation damages); Spector v.
National Cellulose Corp., 48 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (promise by plaintiff not to collect on note
specifically enforced), aft'd 47 N.Y.S. 2d. 311 (App. Div. 1944); In re Field's Estate, 172 N.Y.S.2d 740
(Sur. Ct. 1958) (oral charitable subscriptions valid and enforceable); East Providence Credit Union v.
Geremia, 239 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1968) (expectation damages).
121. See Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (reliance damages); Terre Haute Brewing
Co. v. Dugan, 102 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1939) (same); Kaufman v. Miller, 214 Ill. App. 213 (1919) (restitu-
tion); Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club, 165 A.2d 531 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) (reliance damages);
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.\V.2d 267 (Wis. 1965) (same).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 183-94, 209-23, 231-34, 237-43.
123. See sources cited supra note 16.
124. See Feinman, supra note 7, at 679, 687-88.
125. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 907, 909.
We have been unable to obtain either from the authors orfrom the publisher a list of the approximately
12 cases in which the plaintiff recovered reliance damages. We are aware of nine cases decided during the
period of the survey (1975-85) in which reliance damages were awarded or made available on remand. See
Nimrod Mktg. (Overseas) Ltd. v. Texas Energy Inv. Corp., 769 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1985); Green v.
Interstate United Mgt. Serv. Corp., 748 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1984); Werner v. Xerox Corp., 732 F.2d 580 (7th
Cir. 1984); Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. v.
Liberty County, 406 So. 2d 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Ravelo ex rel. Ravelo v. County of Haw., 658
P.2d 883 (Haw. 1983); State Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Village of Pleasant Hill, 477 N.E.2d 509 (111.
App. Ct. 1985); Grouse v. Group Health Plan, 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981); Stacy v. Merchants Bank,
482 A.2d 61 (Vt. 1984).
These cases in no way evidence a preference on the part of the deciding court for reliance damages.
Rather, reliance damages were awarded in eight of the cases because: (I) the plaintiff did not seek expecta-
tion damages (Nimrod, Hunter, Stacy); (2) the promise was defective or unproven (Green); (3) expectation
damages were difficult to measure (Ravelo, Grouse); or (4) the wrong on the part of the defendant was not
a breach of promise so much as a violation of its bid procedures (Baxter's, State Mechanical). The opinion
in Werner does not reveal whether the plaintiff sought expectation damages under § 90. Seven of these cases
are discussed below in some detail. See infra notes 267-72 and accompanying text. It seems likely that
reasons similarly consistent with a promissory theory of § 90 may explain the award of reliance damages
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ly award expectancy relief.'26 In cases of donative promises, the remedy is
specific performance or expectation damages; in cases of commercial promises,
the remedy is expectation damages unless speculative or otherwise unavailable
under the normal limitations on contract damages. 127
2. Explanations for the Prevalence of Expectancy Relief
These surveys strongly suggest that courts proceed from the assumption
that the appropriate remedy for breach of a Section 90 promise is to put the
promisee in the same position in which she would have been had the promise
been kept. But the idea that reliance is the appropriate measure of recovery
under Section 90 is so ingrained in the academic culture that commentators
seem compelled to find nonpromissory explanations for the prevalence of
expectancy relief.'28 Some of these explanations are ad hoc rationalizations
that need not be addressed textually.129 Others have a superficial plausibility
belied by plainly inconsistent cases. All of the explanations share an almost
total lack of support in the opinions: 130 courts enforce promises by specific
in the other cases.
126. See Becker, supra note 16, at 135.
127. See id at 134-35. Studies focusing on decisions from a particular jurisdiction confirm that
expectancy is the routine measure of relief. See Note, C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co.:
Promissory Estoppel and the Right to Trial by Jury in California, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 697, 715 (1980) (in
California, courts award expectation damages for breach of § 90 promise).
128. See infra text accompanying notes 132-35, 139-42.
129. Consider, for example, explanations offered for promises to give land to a family member. If the
promisee relies on the promise by making improvements on the property, courts typically grant specific
performance upon the promisor's refusal to transfer title. See sources cited infra note 149. Dean Boyer
suggests the following reasons, among others, for the availability of specific performance: courts "are
inclined to treat questions of the relief to be afforded as mere details of procedure"; courts may not be
"aware of restitution as an alternate remedy"; and "enforcement of the promise, not just restoration of the
status quo, is the normal remedy in equity." Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principles from
Precedents (pt. 1), 50 MICH. L. REV. 639, 663-64 (1952). Describing a choice between specific performance
and restitution as a "mere detail of procedure" is strange since the difference between the value of the land
and the value of the improvement-the measure of recovery in restitution-is likely to be substantial. That
courts are aware of remedial alternatives to specific performance is evidenced by decisions limiting recovery
to amounts expended in reliance or to restitution measured by the value of the improvements when proof
of a promise is lacking. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Miller, 214 fI. App. 213 (1919) (restitution of value of
improvements); Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club, 165 A.2d 531, 536 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) (damages
measured by amounts expended in reliance). Although courts of equity often granted specific performance,
they always had available an alternate restitutionary remedy in the form of an equitable accounting that
would require the defendant merely to disgorge the value of any benefit received rather than to perform
specifically. See IA CORBIN, supra note 13, § 205, at 236; 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF REsTrru-
TION § 1.5(c), at 24-29 (1978). When a promise had not been proven by competent evidence, equity in fact
limited recovery to the value of the improvements pursuant to the remedy of an accounting. See, e.g.,
Kauffman.
130. A couple of opinions incorporate reliance-based explanations for the prevalence of expectancy
relief. See Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) ("There is much to be
said for using the value of the promise as the measure of damages, simply on grounds of simplicity.");
Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E. 183, 188 (Mass. 1973) (Kaplan, J.) (arguments for an expectancy measure
"are at their strongest when the promises are made in a business context... [and] become weaker as the
context shifts from a commercial to a noncommercial field"). It is telling that these opinions were written
by former law school professors who might be more receptive than other judges to the arguments of
Section 90
performance, expectation damages, or an injunction, without relying on (or even
mentioning) any of the nonpromissory explanations for expectancy relief
proffered by the academic commentators. 3
One common explanation links the prevalence of expectancy relief to
expansion of the ambit of Section 90.132 Originally conceived as a vehicle
for enforcing donative promises, Section 90 now is often used to enforce
commercial promises. 133 Commentators argue that the reasons for awarding
expectation damages for breach of a commercial bargain lead courts to grant
identical relief for a commercial claim under Section 90: expectancy relief
promotes beneficial economic activity"3 or compensates for opportunities
foregone in reliance on the transaction with the promisor.1 35
This explanation for the prevalence of expectancy relief is seriously flawed.
Section 90 originated precisely because courts were enforcing promises outside
the commercial context in the absence of a bargain. The early cases on which
the section was based delivered a critically important message: a promise may
be enforced even if it does not further the process of economic exchange.
Moreover, these early cases granted expectancy relief even though a donative
promisee generally does not forego other opportunities. 1 3 The early history
of Section 90 thus belies the suggestion that courts award expectation damages
to further economic activity or to compensate for foregone opportunities. Recent
surveys also establish that expectancy relief is routinely granted in cases of
purely donative promises.137 Of the twenty-four cases cited in the Second
Restatement in which the promisee obtained expectancy relief under Section 90,
eleven involved donative promises.1 3
academic commentators.
131. For example, none of the cases cited by the Second Restatement relies on a nonpromissory
explanation for granting expectancy relief. See cases cited supra note 120.
132. See Feinman, supra note 7, at 688 ("One explanation for the prevalence of expectation damages
is a shift in the nature of the cases that constitute the bulk of promissory estoppel litigation, a shift from
cases of donative promise to cases involving business exchanges."); Henderson, supra note 7, at 378-79
("iT]he cases which use Section 90 as the ground for awarding the promised performance typically involve
bargain transactions."); Comment, supra note 35, at 563 ("The propriety of the results dictated by a rule
limiting reimbursement to out-of-pocket expenditures declined as the use of promissory estoppel expanded
into commercial settings.").
133. See Becker, supra note 16, at 132 ("expansion of promissory estoppel to commercial settings");
Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 907 ("Promissory estoppel is regularly applied to the gamut of
commercial contexts."); Feinman, supra note 7, at 688 ("shift in the nature of the cases that constitute the
bulk of promissory estoppel litigation, a shift from cases of donative promise to cases involving business
exchanges"); Henderson, supra note 7, at 344 ("The usual setting out of which a Section 90 promise
currently emerges.., is commercial, not benevolent. More important, the promise which calls for applica-
tion of Section 90 is typically one which contemplates an exchange.").
134. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 929-30.
135. See MURRAY, supra note 16, § 66(B)(3), at 284; Feinman, supra note 7, at 688; Comment, supra
note 35, at 566-70.
136. See supra text accompanying note 56.
137. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 16, at 134-35, 154, 163; see also MURRAY, supra note 16,
§ 66(B)(3), at 283.
138. See Crail v. Blakely, 505 P.2d 1027 (Cal. 1973) (intrafamily donative promise); Saisbury v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974) (charitable subscription); Miller v. Lawlor, 66
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Another common explanation for the prevalence of expectancy relief is
based on the difficulty of proving the amount of the reliance loss in many
cases: 139 the promisee may have suffered a nonquantifiable personal loss1"
or may have incurred unprovable opportunity costs.1 41 Commentators argue
that expectation damages in these circumstances are the best available surrogate
for compensating for a reliance lOSS.142
This explanation works reasonably well when reliance damages are difficult
or impossible to calculate. As a general theory, however, it would be persuasive
only if courts were to opt for reliance damages in cases presenting a choice
between readily calculable expectation and reliance damages.143 The reported
cases demonstrate the contrary: when they have a choice, courts choose expec-
tation."4 Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby45 presented a clear choice between
awarding a specific amount of reliance damages and awarding that amount plus
expectation damages measured by lost profits. The court granted the higher
amount. In Ricketts v. Scothorn,146 the plaintiff gave up employment at $10
a week in reliance on her grandfather's written promise in the form of a note
for $2,000 plus interest. Approximately a year later, she resumed employment
with her grandfather's permission. At the time of his death, the note had not
been paid, and his administrator reneged on the promise. The court had a clear
choice between compensating the plaintiff for income lost during the year of
her unemployment (approximately $520) or awarding the value of the note
($2,000 plus interest). The court awarded expectancy relief by enforcing the
note. In Estate of Bucci,147 the defendant's testator agreed to give the plaintiff
N.W.2d 267 (Iowa 1954) (gratuitous promise of neighbor); Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930)
(intrafamily donative promise); Deveemon v. Shaw, 14 A. 464 (Md. 1888) (same); Ricketts v. Scothorn,
77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898) (same); Horsfield v. Gedicks, 118 A. 275 (NJ. Ch. 1922) (same), aff'd mem.,
124 A. 925 (NJ. 1924); De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917) (same); Phalen v. United States
Trust Co., 78 N.E. 943 (N.Y. 1906) (charitable subscription); Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891)
(intrafamily donative promise); lit re Field's Estate, 172 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sur. Ct. 1958) (charitable subscrip-
tion).
139. See FARNsWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 101 ("To the extent that calculation of the reliance
measure is complicated by difficulty in valuing the detriment, recovery of the expectation interest is likely.").
140. See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 26-30.
141. See MURRAY, supra note 16, § 66(B)(3), at 284; Becker, supra note 16, at 139; Buyer, supra note
8, at 486; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 26-30; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8, at 544; Comment, supra
note 35, at 566-70.
142. See MURRAY, supra note 16, § 66(B)(3), at 284; Becker, supra note 16, at 139; Boyer, supra note
8, at 486; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 26-30; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8, at 544; Comment, supra
note 35, at 569-70; cf.Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 67 ("For reasons of convenience and certainty the
court may choose a measure of recovery which differs from that suggested by the interest protected.").
143. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 69-70 ("[I]f in cases coming under § 90 the expectation
interest is preferred as a measure of recovery merely for its certainty, then we might expect to see substituted
for it the reliance interest in every case in which that interest happened to offer a relatively certain standard
for computing damages.").
144. See Becker, supra note 16, at 154 ("Expectation damages are also generally available, even when
reliance damages could easily be calculated.").
145. 144 A.2d 123 (Del. 1958). For a fuller exposition and discussion of the facts, see infra text
accompanying notes 197-207.
146. 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
147. 488 P.2d 216 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
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$17,000 toward the purchase of property. Relying on the promise, the plaintiff
purchased an option on the property for $2,000. When the defendant reneged,
the plaintiff sued and succeeded in recovering $17,000 in damages-the value
of the promise-even though an award of $2,000 (the cost of the option) would
have protected her reliance interest.1 41
Courts often face a clear choice between specific performance and reliance
damages (or restitution) in cases involving improvements made to land. In the
typical case, a promise is made to give a family member a parcel of real estate.
The promisee then makes improvements on the property, and the promisor
reneges. These facts present several remedial alternatives: reliance damages
measured by the amount the promisee expended improving the land; restitution
measured by the value of the improvements to the promisor; or specific per-
formance. Courts routinely grant specific performance. 149 Difficulty in calcu-
lating reliance damages or restitution does not explain this outcome, for courts
find it easy to calculate and award reliance damages or restitution when the
plaintiff fails to prove that a promise was in fact made.1 51 While in some
cases a change in location or lifestyle by the promisee may constitute a non-
quantifiable reliance loss, 151 courts grant specific performance in other cases
in which the promisee continued to live in the same area and actually benefitted
from rent-free use of the property before the promisor repudiated.152 Even
when the plaintiff demonstrably suffered no reliance loss at all because the
value of rent-free use of the land exceeded the cost of the improvements,
specific performance is granted.153 In light of the disparity between reliance
damages and expectancy relief in these cases, 154 courts would limit the promi-
148. Commentators have argued that expectancy relief may be preferred because it is simpler to
administer than reliance damages. See Becker, supra note 16, at 140; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 66;
Comment, supra note 35, at 570-71. Other commentators have suggested that the equivalence of expectation
and reliance damages in many cases makes the choice unimportant. See Farber & Matheson, supra note
16, at 909 n.24; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 73, 405. The outcome in cases like Chrysler, Ricketts,
and Bucci belies both arguments: expectation damages are awarded even when reliance damages are as
simple to administer and significantly lower in amount.
149. See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Hannah, 431 So. 2d 1186 (Ala. 1983); Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759
(Kan. 1930); Horsfield v. Gedicks, 118 A. 275 (N.J. Ch. 1922), aff'd mem., 124 A. 925 (N.J. 1924); Young
v. Overbaugh, 39 N.E. 712 (N.Y. 1895); Wells v. Davis, 14 S.W. 237 (Tex. 1890); see also CALAMARi &
PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-2(b), at 276 ("Courts of equity in almost all states... have granted the promisee
specific performance."); MURRAY, supra note 16, § 66(A)(2), at 275 ("Promisee will succeed in a suit for
specific performance of the promise to convey the land."); Shattuck, supra note 8, at 919 (the promisee
"will get the land even though it be worth many times the amount of his total outlay.").
150. See, e.g., Kauffman v. Miller, 214 II1. App. 213 (1919) (restitution); Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club,
165 A.2d 531 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) (reliance damages). For a discussion and rejection of other
explanations for the routine availability of specific performance in this context, see supra note 129.
151. See, e.g., Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930) (promisee uprooted himself from homestead);
Boyer, supra note 8, at 486.
152. See, e.g., Horsfield v. Gedicks, 118 A. 275 (N.J. Ch. 1922), affidmem., 124 A. 925 (N.J. 1924);
Wells v. Davis, 14 S.W. 237 (Tex. 1890).
153. See Young v. Overbaugh, 39 N.E. 712 (N.Y. 1895).
154. See Shattuck, supra note 8, at 919 ("The land [may]... be worth many times the amount of [the
promisee'sl total outlay.").
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see's recovery to reliance damages if their objective was to protect reliance
rather than to enforce promises. 15
3. Flexibility of Remedies Under Section 90
Several commentators suggest that courts take a flexible approach to
remedies in Section 90 cases.156 Some read the Second Restatement-in
particular the language allowing courts to limit the remedy as justice
requires-as an endorsement of remedial flexibility.157 The commentators
identify several reasons to limit the promisee to reliance damages, including:
good faith on the part of the promisor,' disparity between the value of the
promise and the cost of reliance,'5 9 ease of measuring the reliance loss,160
and difficulty in calculating expectation damages.' 6'
The claim for remedial flexibility sometimes goes beyond the normative
argument that courts ought to devise flexible remedies to the descriptive
proposition that courts have in fact adopted a flexible approach to remedies in
Section 90 cases.1 62 The reported cases, however, do not support this proposi-
tion. 6' Expectancy relief is granted in the overwhelming majority of cases.
Moreover, as the following materials show, of the factors identified by propo-
nents of flexibility as justifying reliance damages, only a difficulty in calculat-
ing expectation damages explains cases that award reliance, and this use of
reliance merely represents a concession by courts to practical necessity, not a
preference for remedial flexibility. The only other factor that may lead a court
to grant reliance damages is a defect in the promise or in proof of the promise.
155. See id. at 924 ("To accord with the purpose for which the action is allowed, the relief granted
to the promisee should be ajudgment or decree which reimburses him for the expenditures induced by the
promise.").
156. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-6, at 290-91; IA CORBIN, supra note 13, § 205,
at 240; FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 100-02; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 405; Metzger &
Phillips, supra note 8, at 545; Comment, supra note 32, at 564.
157. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-6, at 291; FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at
99-101.
158. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 100-01 (lack of good faith on the part of the promisor
may justify expectation damages); Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8, at 500 ("Recovery of lost profits...
may depend on the promisor's culpability.").
159. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-6, at 291; IA CORBIN, supra note 13, § 205;
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 101.
160. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 101.
161. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-6, at 291; FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at
It.
162. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-6, at 290-91; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 405;
Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8, at 545.
163. See MURRAY, supra note 16, § 66(B)(3), at 283 ("[W]hether particular courts have or have not
confronted the flexible remedy issue, it is clear that the typical recovery protects the expectation interest.");
Feinman, supra note 7, at 687 ("[T]he current case law demonstrates that the remedial flexibility once
attributed to promissory estoppel, if it ever existed, has been replaced by the application of remedies similar
to those available in bargain cases."); Paul T. Wangerin, Daniagesfor Reliance Across the Spectrum of Law:
OfBlind Men and Legal Elephants, 72 IOWA L. REV. 47,91-92 (1986) ("[Jjudicial acceptance of the flexible
damages remedy... has been, at most, nominal.").
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Rather than exhibiting flexibility, the reported cases actually demonstrate that
courts operate within a remedial straightjacket: so long as a promise is proven
and expectancy relief is feasible, the promisee is put in the same position in
which she would have been had the promise been kept.
B. Reliance Damages Are Awarded Only in Anomalous Cases
Unlike judges deciding Section 90 cases, commentators have long resisted
the idea that the proper measure of relief is expectancy. As early as the 1926
American Law Institute proceedings on the First Restatement, Professor
Williston failed to convince members of the audience of the propriety of
expectancy relief. In 1932, Professor Gardner argued that the remedy for breach
of a Section 90 promise should be limited to compensation for loss suffered
in reliance. t64 Four years later Fuller and Perdue, after quoting extensively
from Williston's remarks at the 1926 proceedings, argued that the reasons for
awarding expectation damages for breach of promises arising in commercial
contexts do not extend to gratuitous promises.165 Almost contemporaneously,
Professor Shattuck argued that recovery should be restricted to reliance damages
because the basis of the promisee's claim is injurious reliance on the prom-
ise.166
In the early 1950's, Section 90 was examined in a number of articles that
presumed that the purpose of the section was to protect reliance by the promis-
ee. 67 From that premise, the authors concluded that reliance damages were
the theoretically correct measure of relief in Section 90 cases. 6 ' These arti-
cles helped lead the drafters of the Second Restatement to shape Section 90 in
terms of reliance.169
The most obvious effect of the academic assault on expectancy relief is the
addition of language to Section 90 which allows courts to limit the remedy as
justice requires. This language is intended to sanction the use of reliance
damages in Section 90 cases. 70 Comment (a) to the new section asserts that
164. See George K. Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 HARV. L. REV.
1, 22-23 (1932).
165. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 64-66.
166. See Shattuck, supra note 8, at 941-45.
167. See Boyer, supra note 129; Boyer, supra note 8; Seavey, supra note 8.
168. See Boyer, supra note 8, at 487; Seavey, supra note 8, at 926.
169. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 96 n.27. The articles by Boyer and Seavey are cited
along with the articles by Fuller and Perdue and Shattuck in the reporter's note following § 90 and in
comment (a) of that section. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 reporter's note, cmt. a
(1981).
170. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 reporter's note (1981); 1965 Proceedings, supra
note 91, at 296-97 (remarks of Prof. Braucher); Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 26; cf. Knapp, supra note 5,
at 55 (language permitting remedy to be limited "is ... a response to numerous writers over the years who
have differed with Professor \Villiston's assertion that a promise enforced under section 90 ... must be
enforceable ... to the full extent of the promised expectation").
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reliance is a principal basis for enforcing promises even in the context of a
bargain, 71 and comment (d) goes on to state:
[T]he same factors which bear on whether any relief should be granted
also bear on the character and extent of the remedy. In particular, relief
may sometimes be limited.., to damages or specific relief measured
by the extent of the promisee's reliance rather than by the terms of the
promise.172
The preceding discussion shows that the Second Restatement moves
significantly towards making reliance the appropriate measure of relief in
Section 90 cases.173 If reliance is the basis for enforcing Section 90 promises
(as comment (a) indicates), and if the remedy is to be linked to the reason for
judicial intervention (as comment (d) indicates), it follows that reliance damages
are an appropriate (and perhaps required) remedy in every Section 90 case.
Although a reliance measure is the logical conclusion of its entire approach,
the Restatement itself equivocates by stating that "[a] promise binding under
this section is a contract, and full-scale enforcement by normal remedies is
often appropriate."' 74
The Second Restatement's equivocation may represent a concession to the
fact that the reported cases award expectancy relief. Professor Eisenberg
nevertheless faults the Restatement for not providing explicitly that "[a] promise
that is reasonably relied upon is enforceable to the extent of the reliance."' 75
Without specifically criticizing the Restatement for not fully embracing reliance
damages, other commentators endorse the general principle that reliance
damages are appropriate. 176 Sometimes they qualify their endorsement of
171. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmL a (1981) ("It is fairly arguable that the
enforcement of informal contracts ... rested historically on justifiable reliance on a promise. Certainly
reliance is one of the main bases for enforcement of the half-completed exchange, and the probability of
reliance lends support to the enforcement of the executory exchange.").
172. Id. § 90 cmt. d.
173. See GILMORE, supra note 9, at72 ("[Tlhe unwanted stepchild ofRestatement (First) [i.e., reliance]
has become 'a basic principle' of Restatement (Second) ....").
174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. d (1981). Commentators recognize the
Restatement's equivocation between expectation and reliance as the measure of relief. See MURRAY, supra
note 16, § 66, at 281-83; Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8, at 500; cf. Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d
456,464 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) ("[Tlhe Restatement of Contracts implies, if somewhat unclearly, that
the value of the promise is the presumptive measure of damages for promissory estoppel ..." (emphasis
added)). Some commentators read the Restatement's equivocation as a call for remedial flexibility in § 90
cases. See, e.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-6, at 291.
175. See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 32.
176. See ATIYAH, supra note 9, at 778 ("[Clases in which [courts] feel that expectation damages may
be too generous, and that reliance damages will serve the ends ofjustice better, may be treated as promissory
estoppel claims ...."); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-1, at 273 ("[A] promise that is reasonably
relied upon is enforceable to the extent of the reliance."); IA CORBIN, supra note 13, § 205, at 240
(suggesting "remedy ... can be made dependent on the extent of the action or forbearance in reliance");
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 100 ("If, however, the ground of the promisee's recovery were
regarded as the reliance interest, it would seem appropriate to limit recovery to the value of that inter-
est .... ); MURRAY, supra note 16, § 66(B)(3), at 284 ("If the sole reason for enforcing the promise is
the detrimental reliance of the promisee and justice requires that reliance [is] to be compensated, it may
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reliance damages to allow for expectation damages or specific performance
when the promisor has acted in bad faith t77 or when reliance damages would
be difficult to quantify.78 But these commentators agree that reliance is the
preferable measure of relief for breach of a Section 90 promise. As the follow-
ing discussion shows, this position is not supported by the reported cases.
1. The Cases Cited by the Second Restatement
The Second Restatement uses five illustrations, each based on the facts of
an actual case, to demonstrate the propriety of partial relief-particularly
reliance damages-in Section 90 cases.171 The reporter's note cites three
additional cases to support the same proposition. 80 Commentators use the
same cases to exemplify reliance as the measure of recovery.' 8' As the foun-
dation for a reliance-based theory, these cases merit careful scrutiny.
The first of the Restatement's illustrations' 2 is based on Goodman v.
Dicker,t83 in which the defendants, local distributors for Emerson Radio,
encouraged the plaintiffs to apply to Emerson for a dealer franchise. The
defendants induced the plaintiffs to incur expenses in preparing to establish a
franchise by representing that Emerson had accepted the plaintiffs' application
and would deliver thirty to forty radios. Emerson neither delivered the radios
nor granted the franchise. The plaintiffs sued the defendants for breach of con-
tract. The trial court found that the plaintiffs did not prove the existence of a
contract, but held that the defendants were estopped from denying the contract
by reason of statements and conduct upon which the plaintiffs relied. The trial
court awarded $1500 in damages, covering cash outlays by the plaintiffs of
$1150 and $350 in anticipated profits on the sale of thirty radios. tS4 On ap-
peal, the court affirmed but modified the award by denying the lost profits on
the ground that the "true measure of damage is the loss sustained by expen-
ditures made in reliance upon the assurance of a dealer franchise."'8 5
appear that there is precious little reason for awarding expectation damages .... "); Mark P. Gergen,
Liability for Mistake in Contract Formation, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 37 (1990) ("[If the contract theory is
promissory estoppel, often only reliance damages are recoverable."); Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8, at
499 (noting "injustice to the promisor wrought by fully enforcing the promise"); id. at 545 ("Purely
gratuitous promises should usually only involve the recovery of reliance losses.").
177. See FARNSWORTHt, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 100-01 (expectation damages appropriate forpromisor's
bad faith); Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8, at 500 (recovery of lost profits may depend on promisor's
culpability).
178. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-6, at 291; FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at
101; MURRAY, supra note 16, § 66(B)(3), at 284; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 26-31; Metzger & Phillips,
supra note 8, at 544.
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 illus. 8-12 (1981).
180. See id. § 90 reporter's note.
181. See infra notes 186, 213, 252 and accompanying text.
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 illus. 8 (1981).
183. 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 685.
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Commentators often cite Goodman as support for a reliance measure of
damages in Section 90 cases.8 6 However, a prerequisite for the application
of Section 90 was missing: the defendants did not promise to grant the plaintiffs
a franchise, nor did they promise anything else. They simply represented that
the plaintiffs' franchise application had been accepted by Emerson. Although
the appellate court refers twice to the defendants' conduct in terms of prom-
ise, 87 its summary of the trial court's findings of fact describes the defen-
dants' behavior as "statements," "conduct," and "representations," but never
"promise."188 In limiting the plaintiffs to reliance damages, the appellate court
itself describes the defendants' statements as "assurance."' 189 While Goodman
is sometimes assumed to be a contracts case, the defendants were not in a
position to make a promise. They were not employees or agents of Emerson,
but merely distributors. Therefore, it is inconceivable that they were promising
on Emerson's behalf to grant the plaintiffs a franchise"9° or that the plaintiffs
reasonably interpreted the defendants' statements as a promise. This may
explain why the appellate court held for the plaintiffs on the ground of equita-
ble estoppel. 9' It may also explain why the court did not cite or rely on Sec-
tion 90,192 an omission found odd by one advocate of reliance damages. 93
But because Goodman is a case of misrepresentation,194 the appellate court's
failure to allude to Section 90 is not at all odd. Its decision to deny expectation
damages and to limit the plaintiffs to a tort remedy (reliance damages) is a
natural response to a claim based on misrepresentation rather than promise.
The remedy granted in the Restatement's next illustration includes expecta-
tion damages. 95 Appearing under the Restatement comment on partial en-
forcement, the illustration attempts to establish two propositions: (1) bad faith
on the part of the promisor may justify expectation damages; and (2) in the
186. See, e.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-6, at 290-91; Boyer, supra note 8, at 490;
Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8, at 545 n.489. One commentator notes that seven contracts casebooks
include Goodman as support for reliance damages in promissory estoppel cases even though the court never
mentioned promissory estoppel. See Slawson, supra note 64, at 202.
187. See Goodman, 169 F.2d at 685 ("[w]e are dealing with a promise"; "the promised dealer
franchise").
188. Id. at 684.
189. Id. at 685.
190. The Second Restatement defines "promise" as "a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from
acting in a specified way." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981). The statements of the
defendants in Goodman do not meet this definition because the defendants did not manifest an intention
to act in any way but instead represented that a third party (Emerson) would act in a certain way.
191. See Goodman, 169 F.2d at 685.
192. Id.; see also Slawson, supra note 64, at 202.
193. See Boyer, supra note 8, at 490.
194. See Barnett & Becker, supra note 54, at 488 n.212 ("lilt is likely that the Goodman court based
liability on tortious misrepresentation of fact, rather than on promissory estoppel."); cf. wangerin, supra
note 163, at 55 ("Goodman had nothing to do with the idea of flexible damages in contract law reliance
situations. Rather, Goodman represented nothing more than a routine application of a somewhat obscure
principle in the common law of agency, a principle named the 'Missouri Rule."').
195. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 illus. 9 (1981).
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absence of bad faith, reliance damages are appropriate.19 6 These propositions
derive from the Restatement's misreading of Chrysler v. Quimby,197 the case
cited as support for the illustration. Quimby was an officer and shareholder in
a Chrysler dealership whose principal owner had recently died. Quimby wished
to continue the dealership himself. Neely, a regional manager of Chrysler, and
Condon, a Chrysler sales executive based in Detroit, both assured Quimby that
if certain conditions were met, Chrysler would renew the dealership under
Quimby's control. The conditions were met, but Chrysler, upon Neely's advice,
refused to renew the dealership. In Quimby's suit for damages under Sec-
tion 90, the Delaware Supreme Court sustained the lower court's award of two
items of damages: (1) Quimby's loss on stock in the dealership that he pur-
chased in reliance on Neely and Condon's assurances; and (2) Quimby's lost
profits in the dealership for ninety days, the period during which Chrysler could
not have terminated the dealership had it been renewed.
98
By awarding expectation damages measured by lost profits, Chrysler
provides an obvious contrast to Goodman. The Second Restatement attempts
to distinguish these cases on the ground that Neely, with Chrysler's approval,
deliberately gave Quimby erroneous information to induce him to buy the
shares in the dealership owned by the widow of the deceased dealer so that
Chrysler could discharge its "moral" obligation to her. The Restatement con-
cludes that Chrysler was liable not only for Quimby's expenses, but also for
expectation damages measured by the lost profits because it had acted in bad
faith. 99
The Restatement's distinction is unpersuasive.m The court in Chrysler
cited and refused to follow Goodman, but did not distinguish the earlier case
on the basis of bad faith.201 Without referring to Chrysler's culpability, the
court held that Quimby was entitled to the lost profits because they were "a
direct result of the breach." ' In any event, the defendants in Goodman were
hardly innocents. There is no indication in the opinion that they were unaware
196. Insetting up the illustration, the Restatement proceeds from the facts of the preceding illustration
(derived from Goodman v. Dicker), but adds facts evidencing bad faith on the part of the defendant. See
id. at § 90 illus. 9. Based on this factual distinction, the Restatement supports the award of reliance damages
in the first illustration and of expectation damages in the second. See MURRAY, supra note 16, § 66(B)(3),
at 282 ("On the basis of these two illustrations, it would seem that the remedy is normally limited to the
reliance interest but can be expanded to the expectation interest if the promise is made in good [sic] faith.")
197. 144 A.2d 123 (Del. 1958).
198. Id. at 134.
199. See RESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 illus. 9 (1981).
200. See Comment, supra note 35, at 588; cf. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 3.26, at 207 n.22 ("A
curious attempt to reconcile... [Goodman and Chrysler] with respect to the measure of damages appears
in Illustrations 8 and 9 to Restatement Second § 90." (emphasis added)).
201. Chrysler, 144 A.2d at 134 (denial of lost profits in Goodman "seems to us to be an unjustifiable
restriction as applied to the facts before us. Loss of three months' profits is a direct result of the breach.");
see also Knapp, supra note 5, at 56 (Quimby distinguished Goodman not on the basis of culpability, but
"on the ground that in Quimby the promised dealership was not to be terminable until at least ninety days
had elapsed, and therefore the injury suffered by the plaintiff included a loss of ninety days' profit.").
202. See Chrysler, 144 A.2d at 134.
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of the falsity of their statements,2 3 and they may have been as guilty of bad
faith as the defendants in Chrysler. Even if the defendants in Goodman did not
know their statements were untrue, they certainly should have investigated
before giving the plaintiffs assurances. 04
Promise explains the difference in the measure of damages in the two cases.
The statements at issue in Chrysler were made by Chrysler's employees, not
by an independent distributor as in Goodman. Because they were employees,
their assurances that Chrysler would renew the dealership could reasonably be
interpreted as a promise, and the court construed the statements as a prom-
ise.205 Although Neely and Condon lacked actual authority to bind Chrysler
to renew the dealership, the court concluded that Chrysler was bound by their
promise because they had apparent authority. °6 That the Chrysler court,
unlike the Goodman court, relied on Section 902o7 confirms the critical impor-
tance of promise in Chrysler. Because the Section 90 promise requirement was
met in Chrysler, the court awarded a promissory remedy.
The next illustration °8 is based on Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores.2'
Hoffman, who sought a grocery franchise from Red Owl, was assured by a Red
Owl agent that Red Owl would grant a franchise if Hoffman invested $18,000
in capital in the grocery. Relying on statements by the agent, Hoffman took
various steps preparatory to operating a Red Owl franchise, including selling
his bakery and purchasing and operating another grocery to gain experience.
Negotiations broke down when Red Owl subsequently insisted that Hoffman
invest a greater amount of capital, and Hoffman brought suit for damages under
Section 90. On a special verdict, the jury awarded various items of reliance
damages. The trial court sustained the verdict except for one item of damag-
es.210 Red Owl appealed the entire judgment; Hoffman appealed the decision
to set aside the one item of damages.211 Adopting Section 90 and applying
it to the facts, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the trial court on all
issues.212
Red Owl is one of the most cited and discussed cases arising under Sec-
tion 90.213 The outcome conforms superficially to reliance theory: Hoffman
203. See Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F2d 684, 684-85 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
204. Cf. Barnett & Becker, supra note 54, at 489 ("IT]he defendants [in Goodman] had no basis for
thinking that the franchisor had made any decision.").
205. See Chrysler, 144 A.2d at 127 ("Quimby's statement that he was promised the franchise is
corroborated by the testimony of another applicant for it.").
206. See id. at 130-31.
207. See id. at 133-34.
208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 illus. 10 (1981).
209. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
210. Id. at 271-72.
211. Id. at 272.
212. Id. at 274-77.
213. For a few extended discussions of Red Owl, see CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-5(c),
at 289-90; MURRAY, supra note 16, § 66(B)(3), at 282-83; Jay M. Feinman, CriticalApproaches to Contract
Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 854-55 (1983); Henderson, supra note 7, at 358-60; Slawson, supra note 64,
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did not recover the profits he would have earned in a Red Owl franchise.
Professor Fried defends limiting Hoffman to reliance damages on the ground
that negotiations between the parties had not ripened into "clearly determined
promises."2" 4 Fried's reading finds considerable support in the opinion. The
summary of facts referred to the statements of Red Owl's agent as "assur-
ances," never as "promises."21 5 The trial court repeatedly described the
agent's statements as "representations," not as "promises."21 6 The supreme
court itself conceded that the agreement lacked the terms necessary for a
binding contract, but found the agent's statements sufficiently definite to consti-
tute a Section 90 promise. 217 The court may have found a promise, however,
because it saw no other basis on which to hold for Hoffman,218 shoehorning
the facts into Section 90 in order to afford Hoffman some relief for what the
trial judge apparently regarded as (negligent) misrepresentation by Red Owl's
agent.
21 9
Even if the court really did regard Red Owl's liability as based on promise,
Hoffman's failure to recover expectation damages is entirely consistent with
a promise-based view of Section 90. To begin with, Hoffman apparently did
not seek expectation damages, nor did he appeal the trial judgment on the
ground that he was entitled to expectation damages.' Because the issue was
not raised on appeal, the opinion in Red Owl is hardly an endorsement of
reliance as the measure of recovery in Section 90 cases. Moreover, expectation
damages, if sought, would have been impossible to determine for two reasons.
First, the parties had not negotiated terms essential to assessing expectation
damages." Second, profits of a new business like the Red Owl franchise are
generally too uncertain to be awarded even in cases of consummated bar-
at 202-04; Comment, supra note 35, at 584-85.
214. FRIED, supra note 21, at 24.
215. See Red Owl, 133 N.V.2d at 268-71.
216. See id. at 272.
217. See id. at 274-75.
218. See id. at 273 ("[N]o ... theory [other than § 901 has been presented to or discovered by this
court which would permit plaintiffs to recover."). Under Wisconsin law, Red Owl could not be held liable
in an action for fraud or deceit unless its agent had been aware at the time of his statements that they were
untrue. There was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the agent. Id. at 273.
219. See Gergen, supra note 176, at 34-46 (Red Owl best explained as case involving negligent
misrepresentation).
220. See Red Ow!, 133 N.W.2d at 272 (plaintiff only appealed decision to hold new trial on item of
reliance damages).
221. See id. at 274 (parties had not negotiated size and cost of grocery store nor terms of lease);
Slawson, supra note 64, at 204 ("broken promises [in Hoffman] were too indefinite to provide a basis for
awarding expectation damages").
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gains.'m For these reasons, Red Owl may not be read as a rejection of expec-
tancy as the measure of recovery (where feasible) in Section 90 cases.3
The next illustration' is based on Miller v. Lawlor,' in which the
plaintiffs bought residential property in reliance on a neighboring landowner's
promise not to develop his own property in a way that would obscure their
view. Upon learning of the neighbor's plans to develop his property in violation
of his promise, the plaintiffs sought an injunction. The trial court issued an
injunction that would terminate whenever the plaintiffs (or their successors)
permanently stopped using the view.' On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court
affirmed.
227
By issuing a negative injunction, the court specifically enforced the promise
not to develop the property in certain ways. Miller is thus strong support for
a promise-based theory of remedies in Section 90 cases. The Restatement
apparently included the illustration under the comment on partial relief because
the injunction was to terminate when the plaintiffs (or their successors) ceased
to use the view.? But even in cases involving bargains, courts qualify the
terms of an equitable decree if necessary to avoid undue hardship on the
defendant.2 9 Once the plaintiffs in Miller ceased benefiting from the view,
there would be no reason to continue a restriction injurious to the defendant.
222. See, e.g., Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 92 Cal. Rptr. 111 (Ct.
App. 1971) (lost profits of new tavern denied); Cramer v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 119 N.E. 227 (N.Y.
1918) (lost profits of new clothing store not proven with sufficient certainty); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 352 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1981) (speculative nature of new business may not permit profits to be
determined with reasonable certainty); cf MURRAY, supra note 16, § 66(B)(3), at 283 (outcome in Hoffman
understandable because "certainty and foreseeability limit the recovery of damages even where an agreement
is complete and the defendant's promise is supported by consideration").
223. Metzger and Phillips have argued that promissory estoppel cases may be divided into "'reasonably
discrete subgroups,' each with its own favored measure of damages." Metzger & Phillips, supra note 8,
at 545 (footnote omitted). They cite Red Owl as support for the proposition that "[in franchise cases, the
tendency is to limit the plaintiff to a reliance-based recovery, with lost profits occasionally allowed." Id.
Although this statement implies that courts differ on the appropriate remedy for breach in franchise cases,
the reported decisions are easily reconciled. When a definite promise is proved and lost profits can be
determined with reasonable certainty, courts award expectation damages measured by the franchise profits
that would have been earned but for the promisor's breach. See, e.g., Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d
1098, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1981); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 144 A.2d 123, 136 (Del. 1958). When a promise
is not proved or lost profits cannot be measured, courts limit the plaintiff's recovery to reliance damages.
See, e.g., Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Red Owl, 133 N.W.2d 267.
224. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. d, illus. 11 (1981).
225. 66 N.W.2d 267 (Iowa 1954).
226. Id. at 271.
227. Id. at 275.
228. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. d, illus. 11 (1981) ("B's promise is
binding, but will be specifically enforced only so long as A and his successors do not permanently terminate
the use of the view.").
229. See id. § 358 cmt. a (1981) ("[B]y exercising its discretion in fashioning the order, the court may
be able substantially to assure the expectations of the parties, without... unreasonable hardship to the party
in breach .... ); cf. id. § 358(1) ("[Ain order of specific performance or an injunction will be... drawn
... on such terms as justice requires."). See generally YoRIo, supra note 116, § 1.3, at 12 (courts fashion
equitable decrees to do justice between parties).
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The injunction was thus limited not to reflect the plaintiffs' reliance, but to
avoid undue harm to the defendant.
The final illustration" is based on Kauffman v. Miller.3' The plaintiff
occupied and made improvements on the defendant's land in the belief that the
defendant had promised to bequeath the land to the plaintiff and his wife. After
seventeen years, the defendant brought an action in which he succeeded in
ejecting the plaintiff from the property. The plaintiff then brought a suit in
equity to compel the defendant to account for moneys expended and improve-
ments made by the plaintiff on the property. On appeal, the court granted the
plaintiff's request. 32
The court in Kauffman did not face a choice between expectancy and some
lesser remedy because the plaintiff sought an accounting for the improvements,
not specific performance or expectation damages. To be sure, if the plaintiff
had sought an expectancy measure, the court almost certainly would have de-
nied his claim because he had not established the alleged promise with compe-
tent evidence,233 as the Restatement itself recognizes. 34 But in cases involv-
ing improvements made in reliance on a proven gratuitous promise, courts
routinely grant specific performance. 35 Kauffman and other improvement
cases thus lend no support to reliance theorists. Quite the contrary, these cases
establish that when a promise is proven, the plaintiff will obtain a remedy based
on the promise, not on reliance.
In support of the illustrations,'236 the Second Restatement cites three addi-
tional cases, none of which undermines expectancy as the measure of relief in
Section 90 cases. In Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Dugan, 3 the defendant
counterclaimed for damages from the plaintiff's refusal to sell beer under an
exclusive agency agreement. The court held that anticipated profits could not
be recovered because the agreement was indefinite in duration and lacking in
mutuality.238 Referring to principles of agency law, the court indicated that it
might have allowed the defendant to recover expenses incurred during the
course of the agency arrangement, but it found the record insufficient to justify
recovery on this ground. 39 The opinion neither cites nor discusses Section 90,
230. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmL d, illus. 12 (1981).
231. 214 Ill. App. 213 (1919).
232. See id. at 218. The remedy granted-an accounting in equity for the value of the improvements-is
restitutionary because it requires the defendant to disgorge a benefit received from the plaintiffs that would
be unjust to allow him to retain. See id. at 217 ("[lt would be inequitable and unjust to permit [the
defendant] to become enriched .... ). See generally PALMER, supra note 129, § 1.5(c).
233. See Kauffman, 214 Ill. App. at 217.
234. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. d, illus. 12 (1981) ("proof of the terms
of the promise ... not sufficiently clear and definite").
235. See sources cited supra note 149.
236. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 reporter's note (1981).
237. 102 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1939).
238. Id. at 426-27.
239. Id. at 427-28.
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and the case cannot be read as support for either expectancy or reliance as the
measure of recovery in promissory estoppel actions.'
In Aiello v. Knoll Golf ClubA the plaintiff sued for a declaration of her
interest in land that her father-in-law had allegedly promised to give to her and
her husband. The trial court limited the plaintiff's relief to her share of the
amount spent by her husband in improving the property. 2 On appeal, the
court affirmed the decision on the ground that "[t]he evidence in support of the
alleged promise of gift ... is unconvincing." 3 Not surprisingly, in the ab-
sence of a proven promise, the court refused to grant a promissory remedy like
specific performance or expectation damages.
In Janke Construction Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.,' the plaintiff sued
the defendant for refusing to honor a mistaken bid on subcontracting work. Al-
though the court found no contract, it held the defendant liable under Section 90
because the plaintiff had relied, as the defendant knew it would, on the faulty
bid in preparing its own bid on the general contract. 5 On the measure of
recovery, the court stated that "[i]njustice can be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise; accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to reliance damages." 6
This sentence probably explains why the case is cited under the Restatement
comment on partial enforcement: the opinion appears to endorse reliance as the
measure of relief in Section 90 cases. But the sentence simultaneously-and
somewhat confusingly-endorses "enforcement of the promise." Moreover, the
court actually awarded expectation damages: the difference between the amount
the plaintiff ultimately paid to another subcontractor for the work and the
amount of the defendant's bid. 7 Although the court stated that the plaintiff
was entitled to "reliance damages," it placed the plaintiff in the position in
which it would have been had the defendant honored its bid.248
240. Cf. Slawson, supra note 64, at 213 ("[The] Terre Haute court never mentioned promissory
estoppel.").
241. 165 A.2d 531 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960).
242. See id. at 533.
243. See id. at 536.
244. 386 F Supp. 687 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1976).
245. See 386 F. Supp. at 691-95.
246. Id. at 695.
247. See id. at 698; Knapp, supra note 5, at 57 n.35 (court in Janke awarded "the classic expectation
remedy").
248. The plaintiff got the work done for the same amount as the defendant's bid: the amount paid to
the second subcontractor reduced by an award of damages measured by the difference between the amount
paid to the second subcontractor and the amount of the defendant's bid.
Computing reliance damages in subcontract bid cases is complex and sometimes impossible because
if the general contractor had computed its bid on the basis of a higher subcontractor's bid, it might not have
obt4ined the job and might have allocated its resources differently. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 3.25,
at 201 n.18; Becker, supra note 16, at 143-44; Comment, supra note 35, at 568-70. It has been suggested
that the routine awarding of expectation damages in such a case may stem from the difficulty of measuring
reliance damages rather than from ajudicial preference for an expectancy measure. See FARNSWORTH, supra
note 4, § 3.25, at 201 n.18; Comment, supra note 35, at 583. However, the judicial opinions generally offer
little support for this explanation: courts reflexively enforce the bid by adopting an expectancy measure
without considering or rejecting reliance damages on the ground of difficulty of proof. See, e.g., Janke
Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 772 (7th Cir.
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It is interesting to speculate on why the Janke opinion's rhetoric and actual
outcome differ. As a federal court hearing a case founded on diversity jurisdic-
tion," 9 the Wisconsin district court was bound to follow state law under the
Erie doctrine. S0 The court quoted extensively from Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, which appears to support a reliance measure in Section 90 cases."
Although the federal court's dependence on Red Owl may have led it to endorse
reliance damages rhetorically, its instinct was still to enforce the bid by award-
ing expectation damages.
2. Cases Cited by Other Authorities
The cases cited by the Second Restatement form the core of support for the
proposition that reliance damages are awarded in Section 90 cases. Omitted
from the Restatement, but discussed by other commentators,.-5 is Wheeler v.
White, 3 the case which comes closest to providing actual support for reliance
as the measure of relief. White agreed either to lend or to secure a loan of
$70,000 to enable Wheeler to raze existing buildings and to construct another
building on his property. In return, White was to receive a fee of $5000. The
loan was to bear interest at "not more than 6% per annum." Upon White's
assurance that a loan would be forthcoming, Wheeler proceeded to raze the
existing buildings. When White failed to provide the loan and Wheeler was
unable to obtain alternative financing, Wheeler sued, pleading alternatively
breach of contract or promissory estoppel and seeking approximately $60,000
in reliance damages (the value of the razed buildings and architectural fees) and
$130,200 in other damages (presumably expected profits on the improvement
that was never built due to lack of financing).Y25
A majority of the Supreme Court of Texas sustained the trial court's
dismissal of the contract count on the ground that the agreement was indefinite,
but reinstated the promissory estoppel count.255 As to the measure of relief,
the court limited White to reliance damages, stating that lost profits would not
be allowed "even if ... provable with certainty."''5 6 The court cited and ap-
1976); Debron Corp. v. National Homes Constr. Corp., 493 F.2d 352, 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1974); Reynolds
v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 374 S..2d 818 (Ark. 1964); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal.
1958).
249. See Janke, 386 F. Supp. at 689.
250. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
251. See Janke, 386 F. Supp. at 692-95, 697-98 (citing Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267
(Wis. 1965)). For a discussion of the Red Owl case, see supra text accompanying notes 209-23.
252. See, e.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-5(b), at 286-87; FARNSWORTH, supra note 4,
§ 3.30, at 223-24; MURRAY, supra note 16, § 66(c), at 286-87.
253. 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965).
254. See Wheeler v. White, 385 S.V.2d 619, 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
255. See Wheeler, 398 S.\V.2d at 95-97.
256. Id. at 97.
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parently accepted leading reliance sources, including Fuller and Perdue's article
and Goodman v. Dicker.5 7
Although the majority opinion in Wheeler probably constitutes the strongest
endorsement by a court of reliance damages,258 the majority probably would
have reached the same result even if it had been inclined to grant expectation
damages in Section 90 cases. If White's promise was too indefinite to support
an action for breach of contract, it was also too indefinite to permit awarding
expectation damages in an action based on promissory estoppel.259 Moreover,
even under a contract theory, Wheeler's claim to lost profits would have been
denied for failing to satisfy the strictures of the certainty requirement.'6 ' This
must have been the view of the concurring judge in Wheeler, who joined the
judgment of the majority, but on the ground that the agreement at issue was
sufficiently definite to constitute a contract.261 He would not have joined the
judgment of the majority unless he had decided even on the contract count to
limit Wheeler to reliance damages.
Despite the majority's rhetoric in support of reliance, therefore, even
Wheeler turns out to be an ambiguous precedent because the same damages
would have been allowed under both the contract and promissory estoppel
counts. Perhaps the best way of testing whether the case actually supports
reliance as the normal measure of relief in Section 90 cases would be to ask
what would have happened if Wheeler had been able to secure alternative
financing at a higher rate of interest. The concurring judge almost certainly
would have allowed Wheeler to recover expectation damages measured by the
higher interest costs under the contract count. 6 With large and unprovable
profits not at issue, it seems likely that the majority too would have granted
expectation damages under the promissory estoppel count.2 16 If so, Wheeler
is a far weaker precedent in support of reliance damages than it initially ap-
pears.264
257. See id. For discussion of the Fuller and Perdue article and Goodman, see supra text accompanying
notes 46-58, 183-94.
258. Cf. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 287 ("Wheeler is one of the relatively few cases to the present
time limiting recovery to the reliance interest.").
259. See FARNsWORTH, supra note 4, § 3.30, at 224 ("[a]greement [in Wheeler] ... too indefinite to
support recovery based on the expectation interest").
260. See Comment, supra note 35, at 589 ("[Wheeler] would have been hard put to present sufficient
evidence of the profitability of the new venture to have satisfied the strictures of the certainty rule.").
261. See Wheeler, 398 S.W.2d at 97-98 (Greenhill, J. concurring).
262. Expectation damages measured by the higher interest costs would be the only item of damages
recoverable. With alternative financing, Wheeler would have been able to construct the building as planned.
The value of the destroyed buildings would no longer have been recoverable as reliance damages because
the new venture would have required their destruction. Wheeler's ability to embark on the new venture
would have precluded any claim to profits lost because of lack of financing.
263. Cf. Comment, supra note 35, at 590 ("The most plausible explanation for the choice [of reliance
in Wheeler] seems to be the opportunity to limit recovery.").
264. Reliance has not become established in Texas as the measure of relief under § 90 since Wheeler
was decided. The Supreme Court of Texas has not squarely faced the issue of relief under § 90, and in a
promissory estoppel case decided seven years after Wheeler, it specifically reserved the question of the
appropriate remedy. "Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Tex. 1972) ("We
[Vol. 101: 111
1991] Section 90
Recent Section 90 cases awarding reliance damages are treated in Professor
Farnsworth's treatise on contract law.265 Farnsworth cites three cases in which
the plaintiff gave up other employment (or an offer of other employment) in
reliance on a promise of employment by the defendant.266 Although reliance
damages measured by the foregone employment were awarded in all three
cases, that outcome stems either from the plaintiff's asking only for reliance
damages' or from the impossibility of determining expectation damages be-
cause the promised employment was terminable at will by the defendant. 68
Farnsworth also cites two nonemployment cases in which reliance damages
were awarded. 9 In one, the plaintiff apparently did not seek expectation
damages, which would have been difficult to prove in any event.270 In the
other, the court limited the plaintiff to reliance damages because of the "mani-
festly contingent nature" of the promises at issue. 71 Considered together,
these five cases merely confirm that reliance damages may be awarded when
expectation is difficult to prove or when the promise at issue is not sufficiently
definite to justify a promissory remedy like specific performance or expectation
need not, and do not decide at this stage of the suit [i.e., promisor's motion for summary judgment] what
relief may be granted if [the promisee] establishes the defendant's liability in a conventional trial-whether
specific performance, loss of profit damages and exemplary damages, or only reliance damages.").
Intermediate appellate courts in Texas sometimes have awarded expectancy relief in promissory estoppel
cases decided since Wheeler. See, e.g., Retama Manor Nursing Ctrs. & Geriatrics v. Cole, 582 S.W.2d 196
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Southwest Water Servs. v. Cope, 531 S.W2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Becker,
supra note 16, at 153 n.112 (citing Texas cases). Texas courts have indicated in some cases that only
reliance damages are recoverable under § 90, but that expectation damages would not have been available
in those cases for other reasons. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 734 (Tex. 1982) (citing
Wheeler); Becker, supra note 16, at 152-53 n. 111 (citing Texas cases).
265. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 92-102. Some of the cases discussed by Farnsworth
are cited by other commentators as illustrations of the award of reliance damages under § 90. See, e.g.,
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, §6-6, at 290 n.36 (citing Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306
N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981)).
266. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 99 n.35.
267. See Hunter v. Hayes, 533 P.2d 952 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
268. See Ravelo ex rel. Ravelo v. County of Haw., 658 P.2d 883, 886 (Haw. 1983) ("[Plaintiff] was
at best a probationary employee whose employment was terminable without cause at any time."); Grouse
v. Group Health Plan, 306 NAv.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981) ("employment contract.., terminable at will");
see also Barnett & Becker, supra note 54, at 480 (In cases of employment terminable at will, "reliance
damages can be calculated with ease, though other remedies could not be.").
The point in the text is made explicit in Grouse: "Since ... the prospective employment might have
been terminated at any time, the measure of damages is not so much what he would have earned from re-
spondent as what he lost in quitting the job he held and in declining at least one other offer of employment
elsewhere." 306 N.W.2d at 116.
It may be argued that the plaintiffs in these cases had no damages because the employers could have
terminated the contracts at will. But as the court in Grouse explained, "the [plaintiff] had a right to assume
he would be given a good faith opportunity to perform his duties to the [defendant's] satisfaction ... once
he was on the job." Id. The Grouse plaintiff did not expect to be terminated before beginning work. Thus,
he had a legitimate expectancy in the defendant's promise even if expectation damages were speculative
because the employment was terminable at will.
269. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 100 nA0, 101 n.43.
270. See Stacy v. Merchants Bank, 482 A.2d 61 (Vt. 1984) (plaintiff sought operating expenses of farm
incurred in reliance on defendant's promise of loan).
271. See Green v. Interstate United Mgt. Serv. Corp., 748 F.2d 827, 831 (3d Cir. 1984).
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damages. They offer no support for reliance as the normal measure of relief
in Section 90 cases.2 72
It is not particularly noteworthy that courts award reliance damages in
Section 90 cases when expectation damages are difficult to prove. Even in cases
of bargained-for promises-in which everyone agrees that expectation is the
standard measure-courts award reliance damages when expectation damages
cannot be established with reasonable certainty.273 In the cases discussed
above, the circumstances were such that the courts would have awarded reliance
damages even if the promises had been supported by consideration.
What is noteworthy is that all of the leading cases cited by reliance theo-
rists to support reliance are commercial in nature.274 If courts were truly con-
cerned with protecting reliance in these cases, they would have awarded
expectation damages to compensate for opportunities presumably foregone in
reliance on the promises.2 75 The courts instead adopted an out-of-pocket mea-
sure of damages that fails to compensate for lost opportunities. The reliance
theorists' pure case for reliance damages is the donative promise, where reliance
is unlikely to take the form of foregone opportunities.276 Yet the remedy for
breach of a proven donative promise is always expectation.
We have discussed the cases awarding reliance damages at length because
reliance theorists and the Second Restatement suggest that they show reliance
to be a standard remedy under Section 90. Even these cases do not support the
reliance theorists' claim. Courts award reliance damages only when no promise
has been made or proven or when expectation damages cannot be computed.
Perhaps some of these cases are subject to more than one fair interpretation,
but cases awarding reliance damages for any reason are anomalous. Cases
awarding expectation or specific performance overwhelm the few cases award-
ing reliance damages in number and consistency.2 17
272. Courts sometimes limit the plaintiff to reliance damages when the plaintiff is the low bidder for
a government contract, but the government entity mistakenly awards the contract to another bidder. See,
e.g., Baxter's Asphalt & Concrete, Inc. v. Liberty County, 406 So. 2d 461 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); State
Mechanical Contractors v. Village of Pleasant Hill, 477 N.E.2d 509 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). These cases in
no way represent a preference for reliance damages because the courts expressly base their holdings on an
unwillingness to make taxpayers pay two contractors for the same job. Although these cases arise under
§ 90, the wrong on the part of the government entity is not a breach of promise so much as a violation of
its bid procedures, for which reliance damages, measured by the harm caused, may be the appropriate
measure of recovery. In any case, the courts presume that in a case between private parties expectation
damages would be awarded.
273. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 349, 352 (1981); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 8, § 14-9, at 603-04; FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 12.16.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 183-94, 206-23, 253-64.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
276. See supra text accompanying note 56.
277. See Slawson, supra note 64, at 202 ("Of the possibly hundreds of reported decisions applying
promissory estoppel since 1932, only three have been widely read as holding that damages ... are limited
to the reliance measure.").
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C. Summary
The notion that the appropriate measure of relief for breach of a Section 90
promise is reliance damages permeates academic commentary, convincing even
the leading exponent of promise theory that courts generally award reliance
damages in Section 90 cases. 8 The reported cases tell a very different tale.
The routine remedy for breach of a Section 90 promise is specific performance
or expectation damages. Reliance damages are awarded in rare cases, but only
if no promise is made or proven or if expectation damages are difficult to deter-
mine. Otherwise, courts grant expectancy relief.
The impulse to enforce Section 90 promises by expectancy relief is so
strong that courts have resisted an academic consensus in support of reliance
damages. 9 Reliance theorists offer no persuasive explanation for the fact that
judges routinely grant expectancy relief. It is telling that courts grant expecta-
tion damages even when the value of the promise greatly exceeds the promi-
see's reliance,uO an outcome inconsistent with the conventional, reliance-
based view of Section 90. It is also revealing that the only substantive explana-
tion for judicial decisions awarding reliance damages is a defect in the promise
or in the defendant's proof of the promise. That expectancy relief (if measur-
able) yields to reliance damages in cases of defective promise but prevails in
cases of relatively insignificant reliance confirms that in the courts, Section 90
is about enforcing promises, not protecting reliance.
III. INDUCEMENT AND DETRIMENT ARE NEITHER NECESSARY
NOR SUFFICIENT UNDER SECTION 90
If reliance were the basis of Section 90, courts presumably would condition
recovery on reliance and detriment, and allow recovery whenever reliance is
proven. In fact, courts do neither. They sometimes allow recovery when the
promise has neither induced the promisee to change her behavior, nor caused
her to suffer detriment. Conversely, they sometimes deny recovery when the
promisee has relied to her detriment.
278. See FRIED, supra note 21, at 25 n.* ("Courts now tend to limit the amount of the redress in [§ 90]
cases to the detriment suffered through reliance."); cf. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES
25 (1985) ("Recovery usually is limited to reliance losses" in promissory estoppel cases).
279. Even commentators who support expectancy relief under § 90 in the context of commercial
promises do not endorse expectancy in cases of donative promises, which were the cases that led to the
inclusion of § 90 in the First Restatement. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 937-38; Slawson, supra
note 64, at 211; Comment, supra note 35, at 563. Another commentator appears to endorse expectation
damages, but predicts that reliance will become the usual measure of relief in § 90 cases. See Henderson,
supra note 7, at 378-79.
280. See, e.g., In re Estate of Bucci, 488 P.2d 216 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (expectation damages of
$17,000 awarded where reliance loss was $2000); Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898) ($2000
judgment enforced where reliance loss was approximately $520); Young v. Overbaugh, 39 N.E. 712 (N.Y.
1895) (specific performance granted even though promisee did not suffer reliance loss because rental value
of house she occupied exceeded amount husband had expended on improvements).
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A. Courts Do Not Require Inducement or Detriment
According to the First Restatement, a promise is enforceable under Sec-
tion 90 only if it induces action (or forbearance) by the promisee." t The
Second Restatement also requires that the promise induce action (or forbear-
ance), 2 but dispenses with proof of inducement in cases of charitable sub-
scriptions and marriage settlements. 3 Leading commentators also state that
the promise must induce action (or forbearance) by the promisee. Condi-
tioning enforcement on actual inducement is consistent with the view that the
objective of Section 90 is to protect promisees who have suffered loss in
reliance on a promise. If the promisee would have acted (or forborne) even in
the absence of the promise, the promise did not cause any loss. A reliance-
based theory of Section 90 also requires that the induced action (or forbearance)
have resulted in detriment to the promisee.285 If the promisee actually benefit-
ted or would have sustained an identical loss even without acting in reliance
on the promise, then enforcement of the promise cannot be based on protecting
the promisee from loss suffered in reliance.
A promissory view of Section 90, by contrast, requires neither actual
inducement nor detriment to enforce a promise. So long as the possibility of
definite and substantial action (or forbearance) by the promisee was conveyed
to the promisor, the promise is likely to have been sufficiently well considered
to justify enforcement. Although actual inducement and detriment may strength-
en the case for legal intervention, a court proceeding from a promissory per-
spective might enforce the promise in the absence of both.286
Despite the contrary position of leading commentators and both Restate-
ments, courts do not require actual inducement under Section 90.87 Nor do
they insist that the promisee suffer a detriment by relying on the promise.18
The most obvious examples of promises enforceable in the absence of induce-
ment are charitable subscriptions and marriage settlements, for which the
Second Restatement created a separate subsection of Section 90.129 The new
281. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
282. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).
283. See id. § 90(2) ("A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding... without proof
that the promise induced action or forbearance.").
284. See, e.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-1, at 272; 1A CORBIN, supra note 13, § 200,
at 218; FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 97-98; MURRAY, supra note 16, § 66(B), at 279; Boyer, supra
note 8, at 471; Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 69.
285. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-1, at 273 ("It would seem that injury is what is
required because without injury there would be no injustice in not enforcing the promise.").
286. Substantial action (or forbearance) by the promisee serves as evidence that a promise was in fact
made. In the absence of action (or forbearance), a court might insist that the promise be established by other
convincing evidence. See infra text accompanying notes 331-32.
287. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 910 (identifiable detriment is not required for enforce-
ability of § 90 promise).
288. See infra text accompanying notes 306-07.
289. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981).
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subsection, however, may not go far enough in reflecting the reported cases.
By dispensing merely with proof of inducement, the Restatement implies that
inducement is still required, but need not be proven. Comment (f) elaborates
on the meaning of the new subsection by stating that a probability of reliance
suffices in the context of charitable subscriptions and marriage settlements. 29°
Even as clarified, however, the Restatement's position is more restrictive than
the cases, in which charitable subscriptions are enforced despite convincing evi-
dence that the charity did not change position in reliance on the pledge,
291
and marriage settlements are enforced without even an allegation of reli-
ance.
292
Charitable subscriptions and marriage settlements pose a significant threat
to the view that the objective of Section 90 is to protect a promisee who has
suffered loss in reliance on the promise. The most common explanation links
the enforceability of these promises to social policies favoring the activities of
organized charities and the institution of marriage.293 This rationale has an
obvious ad hoc quality. For example, it fails to explain why the legal system
would not enforce a promise to pay for a daughter's college expenses or for
a son's medical operation in the absence of actual inducement given our strong
290. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. f (1981).
291. E.g., Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Tel., 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974); Jewish Fed'n v. Barondess,
560 A.2d 1353 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1989); see also P.H.C.C.C., Inc. v. BJ. Johnston, 340 N.W.2d
774,776 (Iowa 1983) (reliance not necessary under standard announced in Salsbury); CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 8, § 6-2(d), at 280 ("In the majority of the cases the charity would not be able to show
substantial injurious reliance."); MURRAY, supra note 16, § 66(A)(4), at277-78 (recent cases indicate charity
did not rely on promise); Shattuck, supra note 8, at 933-34 (charity often unable to point to action taken
in reliance).
Some commentators have suggested that although a charity may not rely on a particular pledge to
a general fund campaign, it may rely on the aggregate of subscriptions to the campaign. See Knapp, supra
note 5, at 61; Shattuck, supra note 8, at 934; cf. IA CORBIN, supra note 13, § 205, at 241 ("Action in
reliance will usually be found to be much greater than the amount of any single subscription."). Courts may
be willing to enforce all charitable pledges in order to protect a charity from harm suffered in aggregate
reliance. See Knapp, supra note 5, at 61. Professor Becker has convincingly rebutted this argument, however.
See Becker, supra note 16, at 136-37. Because charities are repeat players in the legal system, they are aware
of the rules governing enforcement of charitable pledges. If such pledges are unenforceable, a charity will
simply discount the total pledges by a factor reflecting the percentage of pledges normally repudiated. The
charity then would rely only on the discounted amount and would not be hurt by the refusal of the legal
system to enforce charitable subscriptions. See Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed'n, Inc.,
407 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Md. 1979) (charity "made due allowance for the fact that a certain percentage of
the pledges would not be paid").
292. See De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917); Phalen v. United States Trust Co., 78 N.E.
943 (N.Y. 1906); Shadwell v. Shadwell, 3 L.T.R. 628 (C.B. 1860) (Eng.). In two of these cases, there were
strong dissents arguing that the promise should not be enforced either because the plaintiff suffered no
detriment by marrying or because the plaintiffhad not alleged that he would not have married in the absence
of the promise. See Phalen, 78 N.E. at 951 (O'Brien, J., dissenting) (no detriment suffered); Shadwell, 3
L.T.R. at 630-31 (Byles, J., dissenting) (no allegation that plaintiff would not have married in absence of
promise).
293. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-2(d), at 280-81; FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19,
at 98; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, cmt. f (1981) ("Courts have traditionally favored
charitable subscriptions and marriage settlements.").
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social commitment to children, education, and health care.219 Moreover, if
the policy favoring charities is so powerful, why do some courts refuse to
enforce charitable pledges that are not directed to specific and substantial
charitable projects?2 95
The social policy rationale for special treatment of charitable pledges and
marriage settlements also fails to explain why other promises are enforced
under Section 90 without proof of actual inducement.296 When the issue was
raised at the 1965 proceedings of the American Law Institute, a member of the
audience stated that in the context of "charitable subscriptions, marriage settle-
ments, and other gifts... it's perfectly apparent that you don't have to have
inducement in any formal sense."297 He proposed, therefore, changing Sec-
tion 90 to reflect the absence of a requirement of "real inducement" in the
cases.298 As revised, Section 90 diverged from his proposal by dispensing
only with proof of inducement (and not with inducement itself) and by omitting
"other gifts" from this special treatment. For the Restatement to have embraced
the proposal in its entirety would have been inconsistent with its view that the
objective of Section 90 is to protect promisees who have suffered loss in
reliance on a promise.
Although the dilemma faced by the Restatement is easy to appreciate, the
solution chosen actually conforms less to the reported cases than does the
proposal.299 To begin with, courts dispense with a requirement of inducement
(not just with proof of inducement) in the context of charitable subscriptions
and marriage settlements. Moreover, courts enforce other promises under
Section 90 without proof of inducement and even in the face of strong evidence
that the promise did not induce an actual change in the promisee's position.3"
In fact, only rarely do courts seem to require proof that the promisee would
have acted differently had the promise not been made.30 1
294. As we will later explain, promises are enforced under § 90 in the absence of actual inducement
if the promisor should reasonably have expected that the promise might induce definite and substantial action
(or forbearance) by the promisee. See infra text accompanying notes 310-12, 344.
295. See, e.g., Jordan v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 276 So. 2d 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), aff'd, 290 So.
2d 484 (Fla. 1974); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed'n, Inc., 407 A.2d 1130 (Md. 1979).
Fora promise-based explanation of why courts divide over the enforceability of charitable pledges, see infra
text accompanying notes 351-54.
296. See infra text accompanying notes 310-12.
297. 1965 Proceedings, supra note 91, at 297 (remarks of Mr. Boskey) (emphasis added).
298. See id.
299. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 910 (role of reliance in determining liability has
diminished as there is no longer requirement of identifiable detriment in § 90 cases).
300. See infra text accompanying notes 310-12.
301. In Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959), the plaintiff sought to enforce
a promise of a pension on the ground that the promise had induced her to retire. The defendant argued that
the plaintiff had not established that she would not have retired in the absence of the promise. Upon
reviewing the testimony in the trial court, the court disagreed. See id. at 166. The court's response to the
defendant's argument may be read as an acceptance of the view that § 90 requires actual inducement.
However, the court's finding of actual inducement made it unnecessary to address the issue of whether or
not the promise could be enforced in the absence of actual inducement.
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Consider, for example, Devecmon v. Shaw,3t 2 the classic case in which
a nephew alleged that his uncle had promised that he would pay the expenses
of a trip to Europe. The nephew took the trip and sought reimbursement from
the uncle's estate for the expenses incurred. When the estate refused, the
nephew sued for breach of contract. The court held that if the uncle made a
promise, it was enforceable because it was supported by the consideration of
incurring expenses on the trip. 03
Although the court upheld the promise on the basis of consideration,
commentators regard taking the trip and incurring expenses as conditions to a
gift and not really bargained-for consideration.3°4 The Devecmon opinion
poses serious difficulties for the view that the objective of Section 90 is to
protect a promisee who has suffered loss in reliance on a promise. The court
did not require the nephew to prove that he would not have gone to Europe and
incurred the expenses in the absence of the promise. On the contrary, the court
indicated that it would have enforced the promise even if the nephew would
have taken the trip without the promise."5 The court also found irrelevant
the possibility that the nephew had benefitted from the expenditures.30°
Other decisions demonstrate even more clearly that the promisee need not
suffer a detriment for a promise to be enforceable under Section 90.130 More-
over, cases of gratuitous promises to pay insurance premiums show that actual
When courts adduce absence of reliance as a ground for denying relief, the decision usually can be
explained on some other ground, such as absence of a promise, unforeseeability of action in reliance, or
failure to satisfy a condition of the promise. See ifra text accompanying notes 324-30.
302. 14 A. 464 (Md. 1888).
303. See id. at 465.
304. See, e.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 6-2, at 275; IA CORBIN, supra note 13, § 203,
at 23 1. The Second Restatement apparently concurs because it cites the case in support of an illustration
under § 90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 reporter's note (1981).
305. Devecmon, 14 A. at 464-65 ("It might very well be, and probably was the case, that the plaintiff
would not have taken a trip to Europe at his own expense. But, whether this be so or not, the testimony
would have tended to show that the plaintiff incurred expense at the instance and request of the de-
ceased .... " (emphasis added)); cf. IA CORBIN, supra note 13, § 203, at 231-32 (nephew took trip "in
reliance on the promise and might not have taken it otherwise" (emphasis added)).
306. Devecmon, 14 A. at 465 ("It is nothing to the purpose that the plaintiff was benefitted by the
expenditure of his own money."); see also Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (promise to pay
$5000 enforced without regard to whether promisee benefitted from satisfying conditions of promise).
307. In Huhtala v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 NAv.2d 640 (Mich. 1977), the defendant promised to make
a fair settlement of a pending lawsuit against its insured for injuries sustained by the plaintiff. As a
consequence, the plaintiff failed to bring the suit within the applicable statute of limitations. The court held
that the plaintiff had a claim to a fair settlement based on the subsequent promise, which might be enforced
under § 90. See id. at 647. The court also held that the plaintiff was not required to show that the defend-
ant's insured would have been liable in the original suit. Id. at 646. Thus, the plaintiff was not required to
show that she suffered a detriment in failing to prosecute the original suit in reliance on the defendant's
promise of a fair settlement.
In Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), the court enforced a promise of
a pension because the plaintiff had relied on the promise by retiring. But if the plaintiff would have been
fired anyway, as the trial court found, the plaintiff suffered no detriment by retiring. See id. at 124. Yet the
court held that it was irrelevant that the plaintiff might have been fired had he not retired. Id.
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inducement is not necessary for enforcing such promises.3 °0 In a common sce-
nario, the insured receives a notice from the insurance company (or from a
party with an interest in insured property) that a premium is due on an out-
standing insurance policy. When the insured reveals that she is unable to pay
the premium, the defendant promises to pay it for her. When the defendant fails
to pay the premium and the event insured against occurs, the insured succeeds
under Section 90 in holding the defendant liable for the amount that would have
been payable under the policy had the premium been paid.1 9 In such a situa-
tion, it is very likely that the promise did not induce the promisee to change
position.310 If, as the promisee stated, she was unable to pay the premium,
the policy would have lapsed even if the defendant had not made the promise.
Despite the likely absence of actual inducement, courts hold the promisor liable
for breaching the promise to pay the premium.311 The Restatement itself
seems to recognize that actual inducement is not required because it lists factors
in lieu of reliance which may make an insurance promise enforceable.312
One commentator has suggested that requiring proof of actual inducement
in Section 90 cases might place too great a burden on the promisee.313 If she
has acted in the manner contemplated by the promise, it may be difficult for
her to prove that she would have acted differently in the absence of the prom-
ise. According to this view, courts dispense with proof of actual inducement
not because inducement is unnecessary to the promisee's cause of action, but
because it may be too hard to prove.314 This argument, however, fails to
explain the reported cases. Courts enforce promises under Section 90 even when
the evidence shows that the promise did not induce a change of behavior by
the promisee, and they sometimes indicate that the outcome does not depend
on actual inducement.315 By contrast, courts in other contexts condition recov-
ery on proof of inducement.31 6
308. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 160 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1959); East Providence Credit
Union v. Geremia, 239 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1968).
309. See Spiegel, 160 N.E.2d 40; East Providence Credit Union, 239 A.2d 725.
310. Other commentators have noted the absence of actual reliance in the insurance cases. See, e.g.,
Barnett & Becker, supra note 54, at 466-67; Feinman, supra note 7, at 695.
311. Because the insurance cases pose a serious threat to a reliance-based theory of § 90, it is not
surprising that commentators have been creative in trying to explain the outcomes. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH,
supra note 4, § 2.19, at 98 n.31 (insured in East Providence Credit Union may have relied on credit union's
promise by driving rather than garaging car).
312. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. e (1981) (formality, part performance,
commercial setting, or potential benefit to promisor may make gratuitous insurance promise enforceable);
cf. hfra text accompanying notes 356-57 (discussing factors listed by Restatement).
313. See Feinman, supra note 7, at 695 ("Some courts, recognizing the difficulty of proving specific
reliance on a promise to insure, conclude that the failure to procure the promised coverage is sufficient to
raise an inference of reliance.").
314. See id.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 299-311.
316. See, e.g., Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1288 (7th Cir. 1986)
(defendant required to prove inducement for waiver to be effective).
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Typically, courts deal with recurring problems of proof not by dispensing
with evidentiary inquiry altogether, but by manipulating the burden of
proof.317 Courts could do the same in Section 90 cases by setting up a rebut-
table presumption of reliance or by requiring the promisor to disprove reliance.
Thus, once the promisee proves that she acted in the manner contemplated by
the promise, courts might either permit the inference that she did so in reliance
on the promise or require the promisor to prove that the promise did not induce
the promisee to act. 318 In fact, courts do neither, but instead treat proof of the
promisee's action as conclusive on the question of inducement, suggesting that
inducement is not a requirement of Section 90.319
While the difficulty of proving reliance does not explain the cases, difficul-
ty of disproving reliance permits the Restatement and other commentators to
continue to assert that actual inducement is required under Section 90. When
the promisee has acted in the way contemplated by the promise, it is usually
hard to disprove that she did so in reliance on the promise, because it is
difficult to show that she would have acted the same way even in the absence
of the promise. Marriage settlements and charitable subscriptions had to be
excepted from the Restatement's normal requirement of inducement because
absence of inducement is virtually certain in such promises.320 If the Restate-
ment has not entirely eliminated the requirement of inducement entirely,
321
it may be because in many cases it is difficult to show that the promise was
not the cause of action taken by the promisee.
Even granting that some courts do not require actual inducement under
Section 90, skeptics may argue that other courts deny relief on the ground that
the promisee did not act (or forbear) in reliance on the promise. 31 Moreover,
317. See FLEIING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.9, at 146 (3d ed.
1985) ("Considerations of fairness, convenience, and policy sometimes relieve a plaintiff from proving, in
the first instance, a fact which clearly belongs to his or her claim .... "); id. §§ 7.8, 7.9; MICHAEL M.
MARTIN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE § 3.01-.04, at4l-49, (6th ed. 1988); Edward W. Cleary, Presuming
and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1959); cf. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224 (1988) (rebuttable presumption of reliance under SEC's Rule 10b-5); Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (same); Shores v. Sklar, 642 F.2d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 1981) (same),
cert. denied 459 U.S. 1102 (1983). See generally UNIF. R. EVID. 301(a) (1974) (effect of presumption).
318. Cf. De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807, 810 (N.Y. 1917) ("The springs of conduct are subtle
and varied. One who meddles with them must not insist upon too nice a measure of proof that the spring
which he released was effective to the exclusion of all others.").
319. See JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 317, § 7.9, at 326 ("When the law conclusively presumes the
presence of B from A, this means that the substantive law no longer requires the existence of B in cases
where A is present, although it hesitates as yet to say so forthrightly.").
320. Two people in love who want to marry are unlikely to let their plans turn on a promise of a
marriage settlement. A charity conducting a large general fund campaign is unlikely to alter its behavior
in response to a relatively small pledge.
321. The Second Restatement has moved toward eliminating an inducement requirement in the context
of promises to procure insurance, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 90 cmt. e (1981), probably
because these promises are, next to marriage settlements and charitable subscriptions, the easiest about which
to prove the absence of actual inducement. See supra text accompanying notes 308-11, and infra text
accompanying notes 354-57.
322. See cases cited infra notes 326-30.
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when enforcing a Section 90 promise, courts often state that the promisee acted
(or forbore) in reliance on the promise.323 Both phenomena are easily recon-
ciled with the view that courts do not require actual inducement.
Although courts sometimes give absence of reliance as a reason for refusing
to enforce a promise under Section 90, some other factor, such as lack of a
promise, unforeseeability of reliance, or failure to comply with a condition of
the promise, can usually explain the outcome. An analysis of the ten cases
denying relief that the Second Restatement cites under Section 90 illustrates this
point.31 Six of the cases rest on grounds other than absence of reliance.3 s
In one of the four cases citing absence of reliance as a reason for denying
relief, the promisee failed to satisfy a condition of the promise.326 In another
case, the court interpreted the alleged promise to be merely an expression of
intention to consider performing at a future date rather than a firm commit-
ment.327 In the third case, the court found no promise.32s In the fourth case,
the court refused to enforce a charitable pledge not directed to a specific
project. Not only did the charity not take action, but specific action by the
charity was not reasonably foreseeable by the promisor.3 29 In sum, none of
the cases cited by the Restatement supports the position that actual inducement
is a prerequisite for obtaining relief. The pattern also holds for cases not cited
by the Restatement. Although absence of reliance may be cited for denying the
plaintiff relief, usually some other factor mandates the same outcome.330
323. See, e.g., Miller v. Lawlor, 66 N.W.2d 267 (Iowa 1954) (reliance by buying property); Lusk-
Harbison-Jones, Inc. v. Universal Credit Co., 145 So. 623 (Miss. 1933) (reliance by forbearing to insure);
Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (reliance by retiring); Ricketts v. Scothorn,
77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898) (reliance by quitting job).
324. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 reporter's note (1981).
325. See Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (no reasonable
probability that plaintiff would succeed in proving promise); Northern Commercial Co. v. United Airmotive,
101 F. Supp. 169 (D. Alaska 1951) (promise interpreted as requiring only that insurance be kept effective
for reasonable time); Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc., 493 P.2d 1220 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)
(promissory estoppel does not defeat statute of frauds defense unless promise was that writing would be
executed or that statute had already been satisfied); Tauber v. Jacobson, 293 A.2d 861 (D.C. 1972) (absence
of promise and statute of frauds defense); Rayden Eng'g Corp. v. Church, 151 N.E.2d 57 (Mass. 1958)
(allegation of promise to insure varied from actual promise to use best efforts to insure); R.J. Taggart, Inc.
v. Douglas County, 572 P.2d 1050 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (bid did not state that it was irrevocable).
326. See Corbit v. J.I. Case Co., 424 P.2d 290, 301 (Wash. 1967).
327. See In re Johnson's Estate, 346 N.Y.S.2d 283, 288 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
328. See Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Transpacific Transp. Co., 137 Cal. Rptr. 855, 860-61
(Ct. App. 1977).
329. See Jordan v. Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc., 276 So. 2d 102, 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), aff'd, 290
So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1974).
330. See, e.g., Dovenmuehle, Inc. v. K-Way Assocs., 388 F.2d 940, 947 (7th Cir. 1968) (trial court
could credit denial of promise); Pitts v. McGraw-Edison Co., 329 F.2d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 1964) (Tennessee
state courts had not yet adopted § 90); Blatt v. University of S. Cal., 85 Cal. Rptr. 601,607 (Cal. App. 1970)
(no allegation of promise); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed'n of Greater Wash., Inc.,
407 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Md. 1979) (no specific goal prompted charitable pledge and therefore no awareness
of future reliance); Ervin v. Ervin, 458 A.2d 342, 344-45 (R.I. 1983) (no evidence of promise); Hayes v.
Plantations Steel Co., 438 A.2d 1091, 1094-96 (R.I. 1982) (defendant did not expect retirement to result
from statement, which may not have been promise anyway).
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The many cases that adduce reliance as a reason for enforcing the promise
are consistent with a promise-based explanation of Section 90, for reliance plays
important roles even under a promissory theory of the section. The prospect
that a promise might induce definite and substantial action by the promisee was
critical to Williston's original, promissory conception of Section 90. Moreover,
foreseeability of reliance remains essential in Section 90 cases (except some
cases involving charitable pledges).331 The occurrence of substantial action
makes it more likely that the promisor should have expected the pror "p: o
induce that action. Substantial action by the promisee also serves an evidentiary
function by increasing the likelihood that a promise was in fact made. A court
proceeding from a promissory perspective may be reluctant to credit the
plaintiff's allegations in the absence of substantial action or other convincing
evidence of a promise. 332
Other factors may contribute to the promisee's frequent references to
reliance. Action taken by the promisee is essential to her claim if, as is often
the case, that action is a condition to obtaining the benefit of the promise.333
The insistence of both Restatements that the promise induce action may have
become a self-fulfilling prophecy to the extent that courts, even if they do not
require actual inducement, emphasize reliance when it occurs. Then, too, a court
writing an opinion in favor of the promisee has every reason to "gild the lily"
by emphasizing the harm suffered by the promisee in relying on the promise.
Finally, it is possible to speak of a person acting in "reliance" on a promise
without meaning that the promise actually induced the action taken. Thus, when
courts say that the promisee "relied" on the promise, they may mean only that
she acted in contemplation of the promise, not that she would have acted
differently had the promise not been made.3 4 Without actual inducement,
331. See infra text accompanying notes 336-38.
332. See Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1287 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J.) ("Reliance ... is a common substitute for consideration in making a promise legally enforceable,
in part because it adds something in the way of credibility to the mere say-so of one party .... [T]he
danger of successful fabrication is less if the promisor has actually incurred a cost, has relied."); Michael
B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1383,
1432 (1983) ("The reliance that the promissory estoppel doctrine requires... can serve [an] evidentiary
function."); cf. Knapp, supra note 5, at 61 (absent reliance, courts might insist on other credible evidence
of charitable pledge).
333. See, e.g., Devecmon v. Shaw, 14 A. 464 (Md. 1888) (condition of promise that nephew travel
to Europe); I.G. Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (condition of promise that
employee retire); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (same); De Cicco V.
Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917) (condition of promise that couple marry); Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E.
256, 257 (N.Y. 1891) (condition of promise that plaintiff abstain from "drinking liquor[,] using tobacco,
swearing, and playing cards or billiards for money").
334. Professor Corbin sometimes uses the word "reliance" in the sense described in the text. Although
he sometimes states that "reliance" is essential, see IA CORBIN, supra note 13, § 200, at 218, he indicates
at other points in his treatise that by "reliance" he means only that the promisee must act in contemplation
of the promise. For example, in his analysis of Devecmon v. Shaw, 14 A. 464 (Md. 1888), he states that
the nephew took the trip "in reliance on the promise and might not have taken it otherwise." Id. § 203, at
231-32 (emphasis added). In his catalogue of questions bearing on the appropriate remedy for breach of
a § 90 promise, he asks: "Was the action of the promisee actually induced.., by the promise?" Id. § 205,
at 246. If actual inducement was essential in Corbin's view of § 90, then its absence would defeat the
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however, the promise is not the cause of any loss suffered by the promisee, and
reliance theory cannot explain why the promise is enforced.
B. Courts Sometimes Deny Recovery Despite Reliance
Courts sometimes deny recovery under Section 90 even though the promis-
ee has relied to her detriment on a promise.335 This outcome is usually justi-
fied on the ground that reliance was not foreseeable by the promisor at the time
of the promise.336 If reliance were the basis of Section 90, harm suffered by
the promisee would mandate a remedy and foreseeability by the promisor would
not matter.337 In contrast, the courts' insistence on foreseeability is entirely
consistent with a theory of Section 90 based on serious promise.338 The prom-
isee's behavior is not central in a promissory theory. The prospect of reliance
is enough to make a promise binding, even if reliance does not in fact follow,
and action in reliance is not enough if the reliance was not foreseeable.
C. Summary
In their influential article, Fuller and Perdue offer two possible explanations
for the prevalence of expectancy relief in Section 90 cases: "[E]ither the
expectation interest is preferred as a measure of recovery because of its greater
promisee's claim, and inducement would not be listed merely as a factor to be considered in determining
the remedy for breach.
335. See IA CORBIN, supra note 13, § 209, at 268 (promise may not be enforced despite action in
reliance where promisor "had no sufficient reason to foresee that [the action] would take place in reliance
on his promise"); FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 99 ("Even if the promisee relied on the promise,
the promisor is not liable if the promisor had no reason to expect any reliance at all or had reason to expect
reliance but not of the sort that occurred."); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACrs § 112, at 448 (3d ed. 1957) ("[In some cases... even though the promisee has incurred detriment,
the promise has been held unenforceable."); Comment, supra note 35, at 577 (requirement of foreseeability
"has been imposed with sufficient stringency for it to be said that actual foresight is virtually required").
336. See, e.g., Atkinson v. American Agency Life Ins. Co., 299 S.E.2d 600, 602 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)
(promise not of character that defendant should have foreseen action in reliance and thus not enforceable
under promissory estoppel); Berryman v. Kmoch, 559 P.2d 790, 794 (Kan. 1977) (option promise not
enforceable because acts in reliance could not reasonably be expected); Hill v. Corbett, 204 P.2d 845, 847-48
(Wash. 1949) (promise not enforceable if promisor did not foresee action in reliance at time of promise).
337. See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 21-22.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88, 91-100.
Professor Farnsworth seems to read one case, Sanders v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co., 593 S.W.2d
56 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980), as not requiring foreseeability by the promisor of the action taken by the promisee
in reliance on the promise. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 2.19, at 99 n.33. In Sanders, an employer
promised full pay and benefits to an employee for as long as the employee remained disabled due to an
injury on the job. Relying on the promise, the employee built a home that he fitted with special wheelchair
accommodations. The court held that the promise would be binding if the trial court determined on remand
that the employee's reliance was reasonable. See 593 S.W.2d at 58-59; FARNSWORTH supra note 4, § 2.19,
at 112-14. Although the court does not seem to have required that the employer foresee the particular action
taken by the employee in reliance on the promise, nothing in the opinion suggests that the employer did
not know of the employee's plans. In any event, Professor Farnsworth seems to recognize that Sanders is
at most an exception to the requirement that the promisor have reason to foresee the particular act in reliance
that occurs. See id. at 99.
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definiteness.., or the factor of reliance serves to release the impulse to compel
men to make good their promises . . . . 339 Although they argue that there
is no way of demonstrating which is the "true" explanation, they concede that
if the "definiteness" explanation prevailed, we might expect the award of
reliance damages whenever the reliance interest offered a relatively certain
standard for computing damages.2 If, however, reliance is merely the cata-
lytic agent that stimulates the impulse to hold people to their promises, then
ease of measuring the reliance interest is irrelevant, and expectation damages
will be awarded in any event.3Mt
We now know that, even when they are readily calculable, reliance damag-
es are not awarded in Section 90 cases. We also know that expectancy is the
routine measure of relief. Fuller and Perdue's alternate explanation for the
prevalence of expectancy relief comes fairly close to the thesis of this Article.
Reliance plays a role under Section 90, but it is at most the role of directing
courts to a more fundamental objective: enforcing certain types of promises.
Various circumstances can make a promise enforceable, including a bargain or
meeting the requirements set out by courts under Section 90. In the collection
of factors that make a promise enforceable, there is nothing special about reli-
ance. Some nonbargain promises are enforced in the absence of actual induce-
ment or detriment. Some nonbargain promises are not enforced despite detri-
mental reliance by the promisee. And even when reliance contributes to making
a promise binding, it triggers a judicial impulse to enforce the promise with
expectation damages or specific performance, rather than merely to compensate
for reliance.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROMISE
The routine award of expectancy relief, the absence of a requirement of
inducement or detriment, and the refusal in some cases to grant relief despite
detrimental reliance all show that the reported cases cannot be explained on the
basis of reliance. In fact, reliance theory does not explain why in Section 90
cases courts insist that there be a promise.342 If the basis of recovery were
339. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 69.
340. See id. at 69-70.
341. See id. at 70.
342. The central importance of a promise is illustrated well by a series of Iowa Supreme Court cases
that arose from a campaign to raise money to found a college. In the first, Pappas v. Hauser, 197 N.W.2d
607, 609 (Iowa 1972), the defendant signed a pledge card stating: "I/we intend to subscribe to the College
Founder's Fund the sum of $3,000." Due to lack of funds, the college closed after a year, and a receiver
was appointed. Upon the defendant's failure to pay the pledge, the receiver sued for breach of contract. The
parties stipulated to testimony of a conversation during which a representative of the college stated that the
pledge was not intended to be binding. After finding that this testimony was admissible on the issue of
interpreting the meaning of the pledge, the court held the pledge unenforceable because it was not a promise
but merely an expression of an intention to pay and was not meant to be legally binding. See id. at 612-13.
The facts of Pappas v. Bever, 219 N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 1974), decided two years later, were identical
in all material respects except that there was no evidence of a conversation between the defendant and the
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harm caused by the defendant's conduct, it should not matter whether the
conduct constituted a promise. 343
The critical and difficult question about Section 90 in the courts is not
whether to protect reliance, but whether to enforce the promise at issue. It is
neither sufficient nor necessary that the promise induce the promisee to rely
to her detriment. Every promise may influence the promisee's behavior, and
yet not every relied-upon promise is enforceable. What distinguishes enforce-
able from unenforceable promises is the quality of the commitment made by
the promisor.
Separating serious from frivolous promises is one of the functions of the
doctrine of consideration. This function was served in Section 90 of the First
Restatement by the requirement that the promisor reasonably expect the promise
to induce definite and substantial action (or forbearance). Although the Second
Restatement dropped this requirement, in every case it cites under subsection
1 of Section 90 that grants relief, the promise was expected to induce particular
and substantial action (or forbearance).3"
college on the effect of the pledge. The court again held the pledge unenforceable because the pledge card
expressed an intention to pay and was not a promise. Id. at 721-22. In the third case decided later the same
year, Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974), the defendant did not sign the
standard pledge card. Instead, its agent mailed a letter to the college stating that "the contribution from
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. has been approved" and the "$15,000 contribution will be made over a
three year period, in three equal payments." Citing a public policy of favoring charitable institutions, the
court held that the defendant was bound to the subscription despite the absence of either consideration or
reliance. Id. at 610, 612-13.
The public policy rationale offered by the court in Salsbury is wholly unpersuasive as a way to distin-
guish among these cases. If a policy of favoring charities had been determinative, the court would have held
for the plaintiff in Bever as well as in Salsbury. (Although the extrinsic evidence may have prevented the
court in Hauser from upholding the pledge, the court in Bever might very easily have interpreted the pledge
as binding if a policy of favoring charities had been determinative. For further discussion of the public policy
rationale, see supra text accompanying notes 293-96.) Not only was the plaintiff in each case a charity, but
it was the very same charity.
The real distinction between Salsbury and the prior cases is the quality of the defendant's commitment.
Rather than expressing a mere intention to pay, the defendant's letter in Salsbury constituted a promise to
make a contribution. See Salsbury, 221 N.W.2d at 610 ("The trial court held the letter was a promissory
undertaking."). The court itself recognized the critical importance of promise in distinguishing among the
cases when it stated at the conclusion of its opinion (after citing Bever) that "where a subscription is
unequivocal the pledgor should be made to keep his word." 221 N.W.2d at 613.
343. See infra text accompanying notes 360-61.
344. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (creditors expected to loan money
based on promissory note executed by defendant); Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948)
(incurring expenses preparatory to obtaining franchise); Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F.
Supp. 687 (W.D. Wis. 1974) (use of bid in computing bid on general contract), aft'd, 527 F.2d 772 (7th
Cir. 1976); Crail v. Blakely, 505 P.2d 1027 (Cal. 1973) (failure to revise will); Burgess v. California Mut.
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 290 P. 1029 (Cal. 1930) (loan by third party); Graddon v. Knight, 292 P.2d 632 (Cal.
App. 1956) (failure to insure); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 144 A.2d 123 (Del. 1958) (purchase of stock in
franchise); Kauffman v. Miller, 214 111. App. 213 (1919) (making improvements on land); Miller v. Lawlor,
66 N.W.2d 267 (Iowa 1954) (purchase of land); Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930) (making
improvements on land); Devecmon v. Shaw, 14 A. 464 (Md. 1888) (taking European trip); McLearn v. Hill,
177 N.E. 617 (Mass. 1931) (discontinuance of legal action); Huhtala v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 N.W.2d 640
(Mich. 1977) (not bringing legal action); Lusk-Harbison-Jones, Inc. v. Universal Credit Co., 145 So. 623
(Miss. 1933) (failure to insure); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (retirement);
Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898) (quitting job); Aiello v. Knoll Golf Club, 165 A.2d 531
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) (building home on land); Horsfield v. Gedicks, 118 A. 275 (N.J. Ch. 1922)
Section 90
The promisor's contemplation of particular and substantial reliance is
important not in and of itself, but because it signals the quality of her commit-
ment. Other circumstances may establish that a promise was sufficiently well
considered for legal intervention. Thus, a promisor who expects a benefit in
return for her promise is fairly charged with the seriousness of the promise. The
promisee's situation may also indicate that the promisor's commitment was well
considered. In cases of marriage settlements, for example, promises may be
enforced even in the absence of actual inducement because of the possibility,
foreseen by the promisor, that the promisee might change her behavior in
reliance on the promise.345 Alternatively, promises made in the marriage
context may be regarded as inherently serious because they involve what is
traditionally viewed as a very important part of personhood.34 6
The central importance of promise under Section 90 is well illustrated by
charitable pledges and by promises to procure insurance. Pledges are often
enforced when there is no reliance.347 Indeed, even the normal Section 90
foreseeability requirement may not be satisfied by a pledge to a general fund
campaign of a charity because the promisor does not contemplate any particular
(making improvements on land), aff'd mem., 124 A. 925 (N.J. 1924); Spiegel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 160
N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1959) (failure to insure); Siegel v. Spear & Co., 138 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1923) (failure to
insure); Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (foregoing pleasures); Spector v. National Cellulose
Corp., 48 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (creditors' loaning money), aft'd, 47 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1944); East
Providence Credit Union v. -eremia, 239 A.2d 725 (R.L 1968) (failure to insure); Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965) (sale of bakery).
Four of the cases cited by the Second Restatement are covered by subsection 2 of § 90. See Salsbury
v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974) (charitable subscription); De Cicco v.
Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917) (marriage settlement); Phalen v. United States Trust Co., 78 N.E.
943 (N.Y. 1906) (marriage settlement); In re Field's Estate, 172 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sur. Ct. 1958) (charitable
subscription). One case was decided under principles of agency law rather than under § 90. See Terre Haute
Brewing Co. v. Dugan, 102 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1939); see also supra text accompanying notes 237-40
(discussing Terre Haute decision).
345. See De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807, 809 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, L) ("It is enough that the
natural consequence of the defendant's promise was to induce them to put the thought of rescission or delay
aside." (emphasis added)).
346. Cf. id. at 810 (Cardozo, J.) (the law "strains ... to hold men to the honorable fulfillment of
engagements designed to influence in their deepest relations the lives of others").
347. See supra text accompanying note 291.
In an influential article, Dean Boyer catalogued a variety of rationales based on the consideration
doctrine that courts have used for more than a century to enforce charitable pledges. See Boyer, supra note
129, at 646. He concluded that the facts in many of these cases do not support the courts' findings that the
pledges were supported by bargained-for consideration. Id. at 649-52. Other commentators have reached
the same conclusion. See, e.g., IA CORBIN, supra note 13, § 198, at 209; 1 WILLIsTON, supra note 335,
§ 116, at 474; Shattuck, supra note 8, at 932-33. Boyer argued that the cases could be explained on the
basis of detrimental reliance by the charity. Boyer, supra note 129, at 652-53. Consistent with this rationale,
he also advocated in another article that the measure of recovery should be reliance damages. See Boyer,
supra note 8, at 487. But Boyer's reliance theory cannot fully explain the reported cases: charitable
subscriptions may be enforced even without the charity's reliance. See Shattuck, supra note 8, at 933.
Moreover, the remedy granted is measured by the amount of the pledge rather than by the extent (if any)
of the charity's reliance. See, e.g., Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974);
In re Field's Estate, 172 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sur. Ct. 1958); 1A CORBIN, supra note 13, § 205, at 241-42 (courts
have always awarded full recovery of pledge in charity cases); Shattuck, supra note 8, at 933 ("measure
of recovery [is] now universally a judgment for the full amount of the subscription").
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act by the charity in reliance on the pledge. 8 Yet many courts enforce this
type of charitable subscription.3 9 Other courts pointedly reject the
Restatement's invitation to enforce pledges outside of the normal requirements
of Section 90.3 0 These courts emphasize the lack of consideration and the
fact that the pledge was not directed to a specific project expected to be
undertaken by the charity.3 5'
Although courts differ somewhat on the enforcement of pledges, the likeli-
hood of enforcement generally varies with the quality of the promisor's com-
mitment. Perhaps the easiest case is a pledge made in exchange for consider-
ation furnished by the charity, such as naming a building for the donor.352
Somewhat more problematic-but still routinely enforced353 -are pledges
made not in return for consideration, but with the promisor's knowledge that
the charity might use the pledged funds for some particular and substantial
project. If the promisor does not receive consideration or contemplate reliance
by the charity, the risk is greater that the pledge was not seriously considered.
Not surprisingly, therefore, some courts refuse to enforce such a pledge. Other
courts apparently regard every promise made to a charitable institution engaged
in good work as a promise that ought to be enforced. While it may seem wrong
to break any promise, it may seem more wrong for someone to break a promise
to support the work of an organization that she has recognized (by her promise)
selflessly does good work.
Like charitable pledges, promises to procure insurance may be enforced in
the absence of reliance by the promisee." Here, too, enforcement depends
on the quality of the promisor's commitment. The Second Restatement states
that courts should be cautious about enforcing insurance promises because of
the severe consequences to the promisor: for failing to pay a small premium,
she may be liable for the amount of a very large policy.35 Despite its warn-
ing, the Restatement proceeds to catalogue various factors that may justify
348. See Jewish Fed'n v. Barondess, 560 A.2d 1353, 1354 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) ("[Iln
reality, a charity does not rely on a particular subscription when planning its undertakings.").
349. See, e.g., Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974); In re Field's
Estate, 172 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sur. Ct. 1958); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 illus. 17
(1981) (supporting enforcement of charitable promise to university based on highly attenuated theory of
reliance).
350. See, e.g., Jordan v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 276 So. 2d 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), aff'd, 290 So.
2d 484 (Fla. 1974); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Fed'n Inc., 407 A.2d 1130 (Md. 1979).
351. See, e.g., Jordan, 276 So. 2d at 108; Maryland Nat'l Bank, 407 A.2d at 1138.
352. See Woodmere Academy v. Steinberg, 363 N.E.2d 1169 (N.Y. 1977).
353. Evenjurisdictions that refuse to enforce naked contributions are willing to validate pledges directed
towards a specific charitable project. Thus, the Maryland Supreme Court, even while refusing to enforce
a charitable pledge to a general fund campaign, discussed with approval earlier cases that enforced charitable
pledges targeted for particular activities. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 407 A.2d at 1134-35; see also Jordan, 276
So. 2d at 105 (in refusing to enforce naked pledge, court discussed with apparent approval cases in other
jurisdictions enforcing subscriptions directed towards specific projects).
354. See supra text accompanying notes 308-12.
355. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. e (1981); see also IA CORBIN, supra note
13, § 209, at 267 ("[I]f the promise is held binding, the promisor becomes himself an insurer and his liability
may be very heavy.").
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enforcement even absent actual reliance, including the formality of the promise,
part performance by the promisor, a commercial setting, or potential benefit
to the promisor.356
If the objective of Section 90 were to protect reliance, the formality of a
promise could not substitute for reliance. On the contrary, formality matters
only as evidence of the promisor's seriousness. Similarly, partial performance
indicates that the promise was made with the intention of performing. Promises
made in a commercial setting or with the expectation of obtaining a potential
benefit are more likely to be serious than promises made in a purely donative
context.357 Thus, each of the factors adduced by the Restatement indicates that
the promise was likely to have been well considered; none relates to reliance
by the promisee.
In addition, the promisor's commitment is generally likely to be serious
because of the possibility, even if remote, that the promise might keep the
promisee from obtaining insurance. This possibility should alert the promisor
to the potentially severe consequences of making and breaching her promise.
Thus, the Restatement's argument for caution in enforcing these promises
actually cuts the other way: a promise to procure insurance is almost certainly
serious because performance involves relatively little cost and the consequence
of not performing may be substantial loss to the insured.
Cases that fall within subsection 1 of Section 90, cases of charitable pledg-
es and cases of insurance promises, all involve nonbargain promises. Enforce-
ment depends not on the promisee's reliance, but on the seriousness of the
promisor's commitment. The central importance of commitment is also shown
by the many cases in which a fault with the promise leads the court to deny
the plaintiff any relief.358 In nine of the ten cases cited by the Second Restate-
ment in which the plaintiff does not obtain any relief, the outcome turns largely
on a problem with the promise. 359 When the plaintiff obtains partial relief,
356. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. e (1981).
357. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 16, at 920-24; Charles L. Knapp, Book Review, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 932, 947-48 (1984) (reviewing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (1982)).
358. See, e.g., Dovenmuehle v. K-Way Assocs., 388 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1968) (trial court could credit
denial of promise); Blatt v. University of S. Cal., 85 Cal. Rptr. 601 (Ct. App. 1970) (no allegation of
promise); Ervin v. Ervin, 458 A.2d 342 (R.I. 1983) (insufficient evidence of promise).
359. See Intermar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (no reasonable probability
that plaintiff would prove promise); Northern Commercial Co. v. United Airmotive, 101 F. Supp. 169 (D.
Alaska 1951) (promise interpreted as requiring only that insurance be kept in effect for reasonable time);
Tiffany v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc., 493 P.2d 1220 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (promissory estoppel does not
defeat statute-of-frauds defense unless promise was that writing would be executed or that the statute had
already been satisfied); Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Transpacific Transp. Co., 137 Cal. Rptr.
855 (Ct. App. 1977) (no promise); Tauber v. Johnson, 293 A.2d 861 (D.C. 1972) (absence of promise);
Rayden Eng'g Corp. v. Church, 151 N.E.2d 57 (Mass. 1958) (allegation of promise to insure varied from
actual promise to use best efforts to insure); It re Johnson's Estate, 346 N.Y.S. 283 (Sur. Ct. 1973)
(statement interpreted as expression of intention rather than promise); R.J. Taggart v. Douglas County, 572
P.2d 1050 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (bid did not state that it was irrevocable); Corbit v. J.I. Case Co., 424 P.2d
290 (Wash. 1967) (failure to satisfy condition of promise).
In the tenth case cited by the Restatement in which relief was denied, the court refused to enforce a
charitable pledge that was clearly a promise. See Jordan v. Mount Sinai Hosp. 276 So. 2d 102 (Fla. Dist.
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virtually the only substantive explanation is a defect in the promise or in the
defendant's proof of the promise.
When courts award reliance damages in cases of defective promise or
misrepresentation,30 they are vindicating the plaintiff's interest in not being
harmed by the defendant's conduct. The wrong resembles that done by driving
an automobile negligently and injuring a pedestrian. By putting the plaintiff in
the same position as before the deficient statements were made, reliance
damages serve the same objective served by damages awarded to compensate
for injury caused by negligence. 361
The theory of liability in these cases differs radically from that in the
typical Section 90 case.362 Courts enforce promises under Section 90 when
they view the promises as serious and deserving of enforcement qua promise;
they do not enforce them out of solicitude for promisees. The promisor's
commitment may be shown to be sufficiently serious by her contemplation of
particular and substantial reliance, by the formality of the promise, by the
situation of the promisee, or by a chance of benefit to the promisor. The
importance to courts of promise explains why the remedy for breach of a
Section 90 promise is invariably expectancy relief (if measurable); why the
absence of inducement and detriment is irrelevant; why some promises are not
enforced despite detrimental reliance; and why the outcome (in terms of both
liability and remedy) generally turns on some aspect of promise.363
CONCLUSION
The central question of contract law is: Which promises ought to be en-
forced? Fuller and Perdue assumed that the legal rules used to sift out promises
for enforcement were based on interests of promisees, and many other scholars
Ct. App. 1973), affd, 290 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1974). But because the pledge was neither supported by
consideration, nor directed to a specific project, the pledge may not have been seriously considered by the
promisor.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 186-94, 215-19.
361. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF RENEDIES 540 (1973) ("[D]amages awarded
in personal injury actions are aimed at compensating the victim or making good his losses.").
362. According to the thesis of this Article, cases of defective promise or misrepresentation are not
strictly § 90 cases because they do not always contain a promise that meets the requirements of the section.
See, e.g., D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors, 520 A.2d 217 (Conn. 1987) (no liability under § 90 because
no promise made, but possible liability for negligent misrepresentation). Some of these cases may be decided
under § 90 because courts may recognize the merit of the plaintiff's claim, but lack other vehicles through
which to afford the plaintiff relief. For example, in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis.
1965), § 90 was the only basis to hold for the plaintiff because Wisconsin courts refused to treat negligent
misrepresentation as an actionable tort. See id. at 273; see also supra text accompanying notes 218-19.
363. The conclusions in the text merely describe the reported cases. we have not attempted to explain
why promise is so fundamental to the judicial conception of § 90. Perhaps courts are expressing moral
indignation at breaking seriously made promises. See Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 553, 571-72 (1933); Knapp, supra note 357, at 951. Or perhaps courts are affirming a personal
autonomy notion that people should be free to bind themselves by promise and others should be able to
take them at their word. See FRIED, supra note 21, at 14-17. See generally DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH
OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 255-64 (1991) (reviewing moral arguments for keeping promises).
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agree.31 Promisees have legitimate interests in promises being kept, and
studying those interests can be very enlightening. In the context of Section 90
promises, however, those interests neither determine which promises are en-
forced nor the extent to which they are enforced. Judges respond instead to "the
impulse to hold men to their promises. '365
Conventional wisdom maintains that Section 90 holds promisors liable
because a person who makes a promise causing another to act in reliance
should compensate the other for her injury. However, when courts routinely
grant specific performance or expectation damages, they do more than simply
protect promisees from harm. Similarly, when courts grant relief despite
convincing evidence that the promise neither induced reliance nor caused detri-
ment, and when they deny relief despite detrimental reliance, their motivation
cannot be to protect promisees from injury caused by reliance on a promise.
Like the rest of contract law, Section 90 is about promises. What distin-
guishes enforceable promises from unenforceable ones under Section 90 are the
proof and quality of the promisor's commitment. Whenever the criteria for a
serious commitment by the promisor are satisfied, the promisee obtains full
expectancy relief (if feasible) for the breach. Issues of both liability and remedy
under Section 90 turn on promise, not reliance.
Section 90 has greatly expanded the scope of civil liability in twentieth-
century American law. Contrary to received wisdom, that expansion has
occurred in the contractual context of promise rather than the tort-related
context of reliance. Far from evidencing the death of contract, the application
of Section 90 by the courts demonstrates that promise is more vital than ever.
364. See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
365. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 8, at 70.
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